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Researchers and shareholder advisers have devoted much attention to de-
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vestors in a company without a controlling shareholder are often irrelevant or 
even harmful when it comes to investor protection in companies with a control-
ling shareholder, and vice versa.  Consequently, governance metrics that pur-
port to apply to companies regardless of ownership structure are bound to miss 
the mark with respect to one or both types of firms.  In particular, we show that 
the influential metrics used extensively by scholars and shareholder advisers to 
assess governance arrangements around the world—the Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ), the Anti-Director Rights Index, and the Anti-Self-Dealing In-
dex—are inadequate for this purpose.
We argue that, going forward, the quest for global governance standards 
should be replaced by an effort to develop and implement separate methodologies 
for assessing governance in companies with and without a controlling share-
holder.  We also identify the key features that these separate methodologies 
should include and discuss how to apply such methodologies in either country-
level or firm-level comparisons.  Our analysis has wide-ranging implications for 
corporate-governance research and practice. 
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................1266
I. THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL STANDARDS .........................................1272
A. The Demand for Global Standards .......................................1272
B. Shareholder Advisers’ Efforts:  The CGQ System ....................1273
C. Academics’ Efforts:  The Anti-Director Rights Index   
and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index ...........................................1276
1. The Anti-Director Rights Index............................1277
2. The Anti-Self-Dealing Index.................................1279
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ................1280
A. Some Fundamental Differences Between  
CS and NCS Companies......................................................1281
1. Nature of the Agency Problem.............................1281
2. Contestability of Control ......................................1282
3. Ability of a Majority of Shareholders  
to Exercise Their Formal Power...........................1282
4. The Main Ways in Which Opportunism  
Benefits Insiders....................................................1283
B. Control Contests..................................................................1285
1. The Difference Between  
CS and NCS Companies .......................................1285
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1288
C. Voting Procedures................................................................1290
1. The Difference Between  
CS and NCS Companies .......................................1290
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1292
2009] Global Governance Standards 1265
D. Allocation of Power Between the Board and Shareholders .......1292
1. The Difference Between  
CS and NCS Companies .......................................1292
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1296
E. Allocation of Power Between the Majority  
and the Minority.................................................................1298
1. The Difference Between  
NCS and CS Companies .......................................1298
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1299
F. Director Independence..........................................................1301
1. The Difference Between  
CS and NCS Companies .......................................1301
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1302
G. Arrangement Governing Potential Value Diversion ...............1304
1. The Difference Between  
CS and NCS Companies .......................................1304
2. Treatment by Governance Standards ..................1305
III. GOING FORWARD .........................................................................1306
A. Evaluating Companies ........................................................1307
1. NCS Companies ....................................................1308
a. Control Contests ............................................1308 
b. Shareholder Voting Procedures ........................1308
c. Allocation of Power Between the  
Board and Shareholders .................................1308
d. Executive Compensation.................................1309
e. Director Independence ....................................1309
2. CS Companies .......................................................1309
a. Allocation of Power Between the  
Majority and the Minority..............................1309
b. Self-Dealing and Freezeouts.............................1310
c. Director Independence ....................................1311
d. Control Contests ............................................1311
e. Shareholder Voting Procedures ........................1311
f. Allocation of Power Between  
Boards and Shareholders ................................1312
g. Executive Compensation.................................1312
h. Controlling Minority Shareholders ..................1313
B. Evaluating Legal Systems ....................................................1313
CONCLUSION........................................................................................1316
1266 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1263
INTRODUCTION
Researchers, investors, and policymakers around the world have 
been focusing increasingly on corporate governance.1  There is now 
widespread recognition that adequate investor protection can substan-
tially affect not only the value of public firms and their performance2
but also the development of capital markets and the growth of the 
economy as a whole.3  This view has naturally led to heightened inter-
est in identifying and bringing about corporate-governance improve-
ments at both firm- and countrywide levels.4
These developments also have sparked substantial demand for re-
liable metrics for evaluating the quality of corporate governance in 
public firms.5  Such metrics can facilitate research on corporate gov-
ernance, inform investment decisions by institutional investors, and 
guide efforts to improve governance by both private and public deci-
sion makers.  Both academic researchers and shareholder advisers 
have made considerable efforts to develop such metrics.6  These met-
1 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development, 21 WORLD BANK 
RES. OBSERVER 91, 91 (2006) (“Corporate governance . . . has now become a main-
stream concern—a staple of discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings, 
and policy circles around the globe.” (italics omitted)); Yair Listokin, Interpreting Em-
pirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 94 (2008) 
(“Over the last decade, a series of important empirical articles have evaluated the im-
pact of many levers of corporate governance on firm value and performance.”). 
2 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 264-69 (2008) (reporting a correlation between various measures 
of corporate governance and firms’ operating performance); Bernard S. Black et al., 
Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values?  Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 366, 410-11 (2006) (reporting evidence that corporate governance is an impor-
tant factor in predicting the market value of Korean firms). 
3 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131, 1139 (1997) (finding evidence that the quality of investor protection affects the 
size and breadth of capital markets across countries); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and 
Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999) (finding that legal systems that 
protect outsiders can aid economic growth). 
4 See Stuart L. Gillan, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance:  An Overview, 12 J.
CORP. FIN. 381, 381 (2006) (“The amount of corporate governance research has in-
creased dramatically during the last decade.”). 
5 See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008) (“[A] market for corporate governance ratings exists, 
with proxy-advising firms . . . using ratings to formulate voting recommendations and 
other governance-rating providers using them to advise on investment decisions.”). 
6 For recent reviews of efforts by shareholder-advisory firms to provide commercial 
governance-ranking services, see id. at 1824-26; Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings:  
How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 8-14 ( John M. Olin Program in Law & 
Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 360, 2008), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1152093. 
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rics in turn have been used by more than one hundred academic stud-
ies, have been extensively utilized by practitioners, and have had a 
large impact on corporate-governance research and practice.7
The notion of a single set of criteria to evaluate the governance of 
firms around the world is undoubtedly appealing.  Both investors and 
public firms are, after all, operating in increasingly integrated global 
capital markets.  This Article argues, however, that the quest for a sin-
gle, global governance metric is misguided.   
The incidence of controlled and widely held firms varies consid-
erably around the world.8  In the United States and the United King-
dom, most public companies do not have a controlling shareholder.9
In most other countries, companies with a controller dominate.10  The 
literature has recognized the fundamental differences both in the na-
ture of the agency problems underlying controlled and widely held 
firms and in the means for addressing these problems.11  But the criti-
7 See Bhagat et al., supra note 5.  In Part I, we review the impact of academic and 
commercial efforts to develop governance-ranking systems. 
8 For purposes of this Article, we define a controlling shareholder as one who 
owns or controls sufficient votes to effectively determine vote outcomes and influence 
corporate decision making.  Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (de-
fining domination as “direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with 
the wishes or interests of [those] doing the controlling” (quoting Kaplan v. Centex 
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971))), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eis-
ner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
9 See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-
93 (1999) (stating that most firms in the United States and United Kingdom are widely 
held).  But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1), available at http:// 
rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/hhm069v1.pdf (“The ownership of U.S. firms is 
similar to and by some measures more concentrated than the ownership of firms in 
other countries.”).  Our analysis holds even if U.S. companies with controlling share-
holders are more prevalent than previously thought. 
10 See Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Cor-
porations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2000) (“[M]ore than two-thirds of [East Asian] firms 
are controlled by a single shareholder.”); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate 
Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (2002) (reporting 
that only around thirty-seven percent of Western European firms are widely held); 
Thomas Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant, Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in 
Europe 4 (CEP Discussion Paper No. 0631, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=616201 (finding that firms in continental Europe are dominated by concen-
trated ownership).  Moreover, in many countries around the world, public firms are 
owned through pyramids or other forms of business groups.  See generally Tarun 
Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:  Paragons or Parasites?, 45 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 331 (2007) (describing a variety of ownership structures and their 
prominence throughout the world). 
11 For works discussing differences between the agency problems in widely held 
and controlled companies, see, for example, Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate 
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cal implications of these differences have not been adequately re-
flected in either the design or the use of governance metrics.12
Because the fundamental governance problems of controlled and 
widely held firms differ significantly, the effect of many governance 
arrangements critically hinges on whether the company has a control-
ling shareholder.  Arrangements that enhance investor protection in 
companies without a controlling shareholder are often inconsequen-
tial—or even detrimental—to outside investors in companies with a 
controlling shareholder, and vice versa.  As a result, as we explain in 
this Article, governance-rating methodologies that use a single metric 
for assessing investor protection worldwide, at either the firm or the 
country level, are likely to produce an inaccurate or even distorted 
picture.  Indeed, we demonstrate that this is the case with respect to 
the most influential and widely used global governance metrics. 
Academics and practitioners, we argue, should abandon the effort 
to develop a single governance metric.  Rather, they would do better 
to develop separate methodologies for assessing the governance of 
companies with and without a controlling shareholder.  Such a two-
track approach would best serve researchers, investors, and policy-
makers in assessing investor protection at either the country level or 
the firm level.  We further identify the key features that these separate 
methodologies should have, thereby providing the necessary frame-
work for developing and applying a new approach for assessing corpo-
rate governance around the world. 
Our analysis has wide-ranging implications for corporate-
governance research and practice.  Among other things, it indicates 
that researchers may need to reexamine the findings of the large 
number of academic studies based on existing global governance met-
rics and reevaluate the governance ratings currently used by institu-
tional investors and shareholder advisers.  Furthermore, our analysis 
Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2007); Ronald J. Gil-
son & Jeffery N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 
(2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Howell E. 
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:  Resource-Based 
Evidence, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2009); Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Gov-
ernance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371 (Claude Ménard & 
Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
12 But see Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 122-123 (2002) (noting that the OECD principles of 
corporate governance focus on the problems underlying widely-held firms). 
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provides an approach that can facilitate and improve future govern-
ance assessments by researchers and practitioners. 
We begin in Part I with an overview of the quest for global gov-
ernance standards and the most influential global governance metrics.  
Among academics, the most influential effort has been made by a 
team of financial economists who put forward successively two indices 
for measuring countries’ level of investor protection, the Anti-Director 
Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index.13  These indices have 
been applied by more than one hundred academic studies and have 
had considerable influence on corporate-governance research.14
Among practitioners, the most influential effort to date has been 
RiskMetrics’s Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) system for rat-
ing firms’ corporate governance arrangements.15  The CGQ system has 
been widely used by investors and pubic firms,16 and its use among 
academics is growing.17
In Part II, we discuss the relationship between firms’ ownership 
structures and the governance arrangements that would best protect 
their investors.  We begin by describing the basic differences between 
controlled and widely held firms in terms of the governance problems 
that their outside investors face.  We then analyze the implications 
13 See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 432-33 (2008) (creating the Anti-Self-Dealing Index); Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1126-28 (1998) (establishing the Anti-Director 
Rights Index). 
14 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 460, 463-64, 463 n.1 (2006) (describing the influence of the Anti-Director 
Rights Index and the extensive literature in its aftermath on policymakers at interna-
tional economic organizations); see also Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526 (documenting the large number of studies on the 
Anti-Director Rights Index). 
15 See RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT, http:// 
www.riskmetrics.com/cgq (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
16 See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics,
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Feb. 2004, at 108, 111. 
17 See, e.g., Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate Govern-
ance?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 11-12 (2007) (using firms’ CGQ scores as a proxy for the quality 
of their corporate-governance arrangements); Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corpo-
rate Governance Norms and Practices (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working 
Paper No. 165/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965733 (studying the 
relationship between CGQ scores and their components and firm value); Reena Aggar-
wal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Govern-
ance Attributes? 21-24 (Apr. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891411 (reconstructing the CGQ Index to find correlation 
between governance and firm value). 
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that these differences have for key sets of governance arrangements:  
those regulating control contests, voting procedures, the allocation of 
power between directors and shareholders, the distribution of power 
among shareholders (i.e., the allocation of power between majority 
and minority shareholders), director independence, and corporate 
transactions that may divert value to insiders. 
With respect to each of these important areas, we show that the 
impact of governance arrangements on outside investors depends sig-
nificantly on whether the firm has a controlling shareholder.  As a re-
sult, the failure of the Anti-Director Rights Index, the Anti-Self-
Dealing Index, and the CGQ system to properly take into account the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance 
substantially undermines the indices’ ability to serve as effective met-
rics for the governance quality of firms or countries worldwide. 
Consider, for example, antitakeover defenses such as the poison 
pill.  These arrangements determine the extent to which a widely held 
company is subject, for better or worse, to the discipline of the market 
for corporate control.18  In companies with a majority shareholder, 
however, a hostile takeover is not feasible even in the absence of anti-
takeover impediments.  Thus, even though takeover defenses are con-
sequential for outside investors in widely held firms, they are unim-
portant in controlled companies.  Using a single metric for assessing 
both firms with and firms without a controller will therefore (1) over-
look an important issue for widely held firms to the extent that the 
metric does not give sufficient weight to antitakeover considerations, 
(2) give weight to a largely irrelevant issue for controlled firms to the 
extent that the metric gives significant weight to antitakeover consid-
erations, or (3) produce some combination of both outcomes.  Like-
wise, using a single metric for comparing countries where concen-
trated ownership is prevalent to those where widely-held firms 
dominate, or more generally, countries that have a different mix of 
these two types of firms, is likely to produce results that would be in-
accurate for many purposes. 
Our analysis should be distinguished from another type of criti-
cism that can be raised against existing governance metrics.  Some 
writers question the value of any attempt to assess firms’ corporate 
governance based on objective, externally verifiable criteria.  They ar-
18 See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill:  A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 338 (2000) (noting the limited nature of the 
empirical research done on takeover defenses). 
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gue that any useful governance evaluation must take into account a 
rich set of dimensions (such as the character of the individuals in-
volved) that can only be assessed subjectively.19  In contrast, we do not 
question the feasibility of developing a methodology for large-scale 
governance assessments based on objective criteria.  Rather, our cri-
tique is constructive: we seek to advance the project of developing 
governance metrics based on objective and generally applicable crite-
ria, not to abandon it altogether. 
We therefore discuss in Part III how the assessment of corporate-
governance arrangements should proceed.  We argue that academics 
and practitioners should seek to develop separate systems—one for 
controlled and another for widely held firms—with each based on a set 
of objective and externally verifiable dimensions.  We contribute to this 
effort by identifying, for both controlled and widely held firms, which 
governance dimensions should occupy an important role and—no less 
important—which dimensions should not.  When assessing an individ-
ual company, one should use the rating methodology that fits the 
company's ownership structure.  We also discuss how one should use 
these separate systems to assess investor protection at the country level.  
Specifically, we explain why keeping separate scores for how a country 
protects investors in companies with and without a controlling share-
holder is valuable for researchers, policymakers, and investors. 
For ease of exposition, we shall refer throughout to companies 
with a controlling shareholder as “CS companies” and to those with-
out a controller as “NCS companies.”  At the outset, we should ac-
knowledge that some public companies lie in the gray area between 
these two pure types because they have a dominant shareholder with 
substantial influence but not a complete lock on control.  We leave for 
another day the refinement of our analysis necessary for extending it 
to such companies.  Here we wish to focus on the task that we view as 
most important and pressing given current practices:  designing ap-
propriate evaluation systems for the numerous public companies 
19 See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 5, at 1808 (“[T]here is no one ‘best’ measure 
of corporate governance:  The most effective governance institution depends on con-
text and on firms’ specific circumstances.”); Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Indus-
try, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 908 (2007) (arguing that one-size-fits-all methodologies “may 
not capture relevant nuances in corporate governance policies and behaviors”); see also
J. Harold Mulherin, Corporations, Collective Action and Corporate Governance:  One Size Does 
Not Fit All, 124 PUB. CHOICE 179, 180 (2005) (“The multidimensional nature of corpo-
rate governance indicates that the focus in many reform proposals on a narrow set of 
mechanisms ignores the substitutability and complementarity provided by the broad 
set of forces operating on the corporation.”). 
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around the world that can easily be classified as either CS or NCS.  
These companies should be subject to the separate evaluation systems 
that we advocate, not to a single, global governance metric. 
I. THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL STANDARDS
A.  The Demand for Global Standards 
In recent years, corporate governance has become an important 
topic for academics, institutional investors, and policymakers.  There 
is a widespread belief that the quality of corporate governance and in-
vestor protection can affect the performance of firms and economies.  
At the firm level, inadequate investor protection may reduce firm 
value and increase firms’ cost of capital.20  At the country level, inade-
quate investor protection may impede stock market development and 
undermine financial growth.21
Not surprisingly, the growing recognition of corporate govern-
ance’s importance has sparked substantial interest in measuring the 
quality of corporate-governance arrangements across firms and coun-
tries.  Scholars have sought such measures to study the link between 
corporate governance and economic outcomes for both firms and 
economies.22  Policymakers—including those affiliated with the World 
Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—have been at-
tracted to the promise of metrics that can facilitate efforts to improve 
countries’ investor-protection systems and to assess their progress in 
doing so.23  Finally, the growth of institutional investing and investors’ 
20 See Doidge et al., supra note 17, at 2 (“Better governance enables firms to access 
capital markets on better terms, which is valuable for firms intending to raise funds.”). 
21 See Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development 32 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10417, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=476083 (citing studies showing a positive correlation between 
legal institutions that protect property rights and firm- and stock-price efficiency). 
22 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (documenting the negative effect of certain “entrenchment” 
corporate-governance practices); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 110-14 (2003) (measuring the effects of different corporate-
governance provisions on equity prices). 
23 For example, the World Bank’s “Doing Business” survey, which provides objec-
tive measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies, 
relies on the Anti-Self-Dealing Index, which we discuss below, to measure countries’ 
level of investor protection.  See Doing Business, Protecting Investors, http:// 
www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/ProtectingInvestors.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2009).  The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program uses the World 
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increased attention to corporate governance has induced shareholder 
advisers to develop governance metrics that could inform investment 
decisions in companies around the world.24
A comprehensive effort to survey all existing metrics and method-
ologies for assessing governance arrangements around the world 
would require substantial space and, we believe, is unnecessary for es-
tablishing our main points.  It will be useful, however, to illustrate 
these points by reference to commonly used metrics.  Section B dis-
cusses the most influential ranking system developed by a shareholder 
adviser—RiskMetrics’s CGQ system.  Section C describes the most in-
fluential global metrics developed by academics—the Anti-Director 
Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index. 
B. Shareholder Advisers’ Efforts:  The CGQ System 
RiskMetrics is the world’s dominant provider of shareholder-
advisory services to institutional investors.25  Prior to being acquired by 
RiskMetrics in 2007, its shareholder-advisory services operated inde-
pendently as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).26  When going 
public in 2007, RiskMetrics reported that it “served approximately 1150 
financial institutions that together manage an estimated $20 trillion,”27
provided research coverage on more than 7400 U.S.-based companies 
and approximately 22,000 non-U.S. companies,28 and had issued vote 
recommendations for more than 38,000 shareholder meetings across 
Bank’s Doing Business database to assess countries’ level of investor protection.  See
IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK 74 box 4.1 (2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch04.pdf. 
24 See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 4-13 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 (noting the impact of institutional investors’ grow-
ing presence and the demand for governance-related services). 
25 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEET-
INGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY 
VOTING 8 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf (describing 
ISS as “the dominant advisory firm” and perhaps even “a potential barrier to competi-
tion in this industry”); Rose, supra note 19, at 889-90 (reporting some executives’ belief 
that RiskMetrics—then ISS—“may control a third or more of the shareholder votes” in 
the industry). 
26 RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Amended Registration Statement for Face-Amount Cer-
tificate Companies (Form S-1/A), at 14, 87 (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http:// 
investor.riskmetrics.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=215573&p=irol-sec (click “last”; then choose 
document). 
27 Id. at 87. 
28 Id. at 88. 
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100 countries during the preceding year.29  It is widely assumed that 
RiskMetrics’s voting recommendations can affect vote outcomes,30 and 
academic studies on the effects of shareholder advisers commonly fo-
cus on RiskMetrics’s recommendations.31
Since 2002, ISS and RiskMetrics have offered a corporate-
governance-rating system named the Corporate Governance Quotient.  
RiskMetrics currently rates the governance arrangements of more 
than 7400 companies in more than thirty markets.32  Many institu-
tional investors receive these ratings as part of their subscription to 
RiskMetrics’s services.33  Given the dominance of RiskMetrics in the 
proxy-advisory market, it is not surprising that its CGQ ratings receive 
much attention in the marketplace.34  Law firms advise their public-
29 Id. at 87. 
30 See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:  An 
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 693 (2007) (“Getting a favorable ISS recommen-
dation is therefore frequently essential to victory.”); see also Jie Cai et al., Electing Direc-
tors, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1101924 (finding that directors with negative ISS recommendations receive 
nineteen percent fewer votes than other directors); Ying Duan, The Role of Mutual 
Funds in Corporate Governance:  Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and 
Trading Behavior 2 ( Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1028367 (stating that mutual funds are more likely to vote against 
management than to sell when management’s recommendations on proposals conflict 
with those of ISS). 
31 See, e.g., Stephen Choi et al., Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advisors 1 
(NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Org. Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127282 (noting that ISS was “claimed to sway” between 
twenty and thirty percent of proxy votes); Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advi-
sory Services in Proxy Voting 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=966181 (quoting one Merrill Lynch analyst describing an 
ISS recommendation, “If it had gone the other way, the deal would have been dead.  
Now, it’s a horse race.”). 
32 See RISKMETRICS GROUP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE QUOTIENT, http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ%20FAQ.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
33 See Daines et al., supra note 6, at 2, 4 (reporting varied empirical accounts of the 
influence of governance ratings and noting that RiskMetrics was the largest commer-
cial rater). 
34 See Rose, supra note 19, at 898-99 (“Proxy advisers generally base their decisions 
on corporate governance standards that are derived from the same policies as those 
used to formulate governance ratings and related governance advice.”); see also INSTI-
TUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS US CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2007 UPDATES 24 
(2007), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2007_US_Policy_ 
Update.pdf (describing steps taken to align governance ratings with the company’s 
voting policy).
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company clients on how to improve their CGQ scores,35 public com-
panies with high CGQ scores boast about them,36 RiskMetrics offers 
public companies fee-based consulting services for improving their 
CGQ scores,37 and the popular “Yahoo! Finance” web site includes 
CGQ scores in companies’ online profiles.38
Although the CGQ system was developed by a commercial-
shareholder adviser, academics increasingly use it as a measure of the 
quality of firms’ governance arrangements.  Researchers, for example, 
have analyzed the link between RiskMetrics’s governance scores and 
firm performance,39 tried to assess which CGQ factors affect firm 
valuation,40 and used companies’ CGQ scores to study governance dif-
ferences between banking and nonbanking firms.41
Although RiskMetrics has one set of criteria (also referred to as 
factors) for rating U.S. firms and another set for rating non-U.S. firms, 
the two sets largely overlap.  Both divide corporate-governance factors 
into eight categories:  board (including board size and the nominat-
ing committees); audit; charter/bylaws (including features such as 
poison pills and special meetings); antitakeover provisions; executive 
and director compensation; progressive practices (for example, CEO-
succession planning); ownership (including board-performance re-
35 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KOLAR & ANDREW J. NEUHARTH, OPPENHEIMER WOLFF &
DONNELLY LLP, WHAT’S YOUR “CGQ” IQ? WHAT EVERY CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT (2007), available at
http://www.oppenheimer.com/newsletters/CGQ_IQ.pdf.
36 See, e.g., Alliant Techsystems Inc., Corporate Governance, http://www.atk.com/ 
CorporateGovernance/corpgov_commitment.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (proudly 
touting its CGQ score). 
37 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS:
ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING
10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf (noting that ISS “of-
fers corporate governance consulting services to help clients understand and improve 
their corporate governance ratings”). 
38 See, e.g., Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corporation, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ 
pr?s=MSFT (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
39 See, e.g., Ruth W. Epps & Sandra J. Cereola, Do Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) Corporate Governance Ratings Reflect a Company’s Operating Performance?, 19 CRITICAL 
PERSP. ON ACCT. 1135 (2008) (presenting methodology for comparing CGQ scores 
and corporate performance and concluding that there is no relationship). 
40 See Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valua-
tion, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 411 (2006) (identifying seven governance factors 
that are the key drivers of the link between governance and valuation).
41 See Chenchuramaiah Bathala et al., Industry Differences in Corporate Governance:  
The Case of Banking and Non-Banking Firms, 13 ICFAI J. APPLIED FIN. 17 (relying on CGQ 
scores to study governance differences between bank and nonbank firms). 
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view and stock ownership by directors); and director education.  Both 
sets include similar criteria within each of the eight areas.42
The CGQ system rates the performance of any given company 
with respect to each factor and then uses this rating to produce both a 
raw score for the company and a relative score that rates the company 
in comparison to others in the same investment index or industry 
group.43  For our purposes, the key feature of the CGQ system is that it 
applies the same criteria to companies that do and do not have a con-
trolling shareholder.  As we shall show in subsequent sections, this 
uniform approach is unwarranted. 
Perhaps because RiskMetrics is headquartered in the United 
States, where CS companies are less common, a significant fraction of 
the CGQ factors may be valuable for outside investors in NCS compa-
nies but are irrelevant, or even harmful, for investor protection in CS 
companies.  Whatever the reason for this feature, we shall show that 
the CGQ system clearly illustrates the problems that arise when a sin-
gle metric is used for assessing governance around the world.  
C. Academics’ Efforts:  The Anti-Director Rights Index 
 and the Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
Among academic researchers, the most influential metric for 
evaluating governance arrangements worldwide has been the Anti-
Director Rights Index, developed by a team of four financial econo-
mists. More recently, three members of this team joined a World Bank 
economist to construct a new metric, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index, as 
an alternative to the Anti-Director Rights Index. 
42 For a list of the U.S. governance attributes, see RISKMETRICS GROUP, SUMMARY:
CGQ RATINGS CRITERIA FOR US COMPANIES, http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/ 
default/files/CGQ_Criteria_US.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) [hereinafter RISKMET-
RICS, U.S. CRITERIA].  For a list of the non-U.S. governance variables, see RISKMETRICS 
GROUP, SUMMARY: CGQ RATINGS CRITERIA FOR NON-US COMPANIES, http:// 
www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ_Criteria_exUS.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009) [hereinafter RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA].  A more detailed description of 
the U.S. CGQ factors may be found in RISKMETRICS GROUP, CGQ BEST PRACTICES MAN-
UAL (US) (2008) [hereinafter, RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES].  A more detailed de-
scription of the non-U.S. CGQ factors may be found in RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT: INDICATOR DEFINITIONS (NON-U.S. COMPANIES) (2007) [here-
inafter, RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS].  The latter two documents may 
be requested from RiskMetrics at http://www.riskmetrics.com/contact. 
43 See RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT: METHODOLOGY,
http://www.riskmetrics.com/cgq/methodology (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
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1.  The Anti-Director Rights Index
In a 1998 article titled Law and Finance, four financial econo-
mists—La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (commonly 
referred to in subsequent work as LLSV)—developed the Anti-
Director Rights Index and used it to study and compare investor pro-
tection across forty-nine countries.44  Their findings sparked a vast 
academic literature.  Indeed, academics have thus far used the Anti-
Director Rights Index in almost one hundred cross-country quantita-
tive studies,45 for example, to examine the association between inves-
tor protection and firm valuation, voting premia, firm-level corporate-
governance mechanisms, the prevalence of earnings management, 
and the depth of financial crises.46  The use of the index has not been 
44 La Porta et al., supra note 13; see also Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 24 (2000) (arguing that strong investor protec-
tion is empirically linked with “valuable and broad financial markets”); La Porta et al., 
supra note 3, at 1132 (“We compare external finance across 49 countries as a function of 
the origin of their laws, the quality of legal investor protections, and the quality of law 
enforcement.”).  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Ori-
gins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 286-87 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic 
Consequences] (developing a “Legal Origins Theory” based on historical differences be-
tween various legal traditions). 
45 See Spamann, supra note 14, at 1-3 (reporting that the Anti-Director Rights In-
dex has been used in almost one hundred such studies but challenging the accuracy of 
the underlying data). 
46 See generally Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal:  Firm Attributes, Legal 
Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005) (studying the extent of variation be-
tween firm governance and the strength of the legal regime); Simon Johnson et al., Cor-
porate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 142 (2000) (present-
ing “evidence that the weakness of legal institutions for corporate governance had” an 
impact on the Asian financial crisis); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corpo-
rate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) (analyzing the theoretical and empirical effects of 
investor protection on firm valuation); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting 
Rights and Control:  A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003) (examining con-
trol premia); Christian Leuz et al., Earnings Management and Investor Protection:  An Inter-
national Comparison, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 505, 506 (2003) (providing “comparative evidence 
on corporate earnings management across 31 countries”).  More recent studies have 
also explored these themes.  See, e.g., Jay Dahya et al., Dominant Shareholders, Corporate 
Boards, and Corporate Value:  A Cross-Country Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 73-76 (2008) 
(examining the role of board composition and independent directors in relation to ex-
ternal investor protections in firms with a dominant shareholder); Ivalina Kalcheva & 
Karl V. Lins, International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Prob-
lems, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1087, 1087-88 (2007) (finding a relationship between cash man-
agement and firm valuation when external investor protection is weak but not when it is 
strong); Mariassunta Giannetti & Yrjö Koskinen, Investor Protection, Equity Returns, 
and Financial Globalization 1-3 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=942513 (arguing that weak investor-protection mechanisms 
create an incentive for shareholders to purchase controlling stakes). 
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limited to corporate-finance research but has extended to the study of 
other issues, such as financial integration47 and the relationship be-
tween risk sharing and industrial specialization.48
The Anti-Director Rights Index consists of six components.49
Three focus on shareholder voting rights:  the requirement that 
shareholders deposit their shares before a shareholder meeting, the 
ability of shareholders to cast a vote by mail, and the minimum per-
centage of share ownership that allows a shareholder to call a special 
shareholder meeting.50
A fourth component focuses on shareholders’ preemptive rights—
whether the law grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new 
issues of stock (unless the shareholders have waived their right by a 
vote).51  A fifth component focuses on cumulative voting—whether 
there is a mechanism by which minority interests may name a propor-
tional number of directors to the board.52  The final component, often 
referred to as “oppressed minority mechanisms,” focuses on whether 
minority shareholders objecting to fundamental changes (such as 
mergers, asset dispositions, and changes to the articles of incorpora-
tion) have a right to challenge those decisions in court or to “exit” by 
requiring the company to purchase their shares.53
As we will explain, the Anti-Director Rights Index cannot provide 
an adequate measure of investor-protection levels around the world.  
Most notably, three of the index’s components—shareholders’ ability 
to vote by mail, to vote without depositing shares, and to call a special 
meeting—are largely irrelevant to companies with a controlling 
shareholder:  in such companies, regardless of the voting arrange-
ments in place, minority shareholders normally will lack effective 
power either to pass resolutions that the majority shareholder opposes 
or to block resolutions that the majority shareholder favors.  
47 See Jean Imbs, The Real Effects of Financial Integration, 68 J. INT’L ECON. 296, 318-
19 (2006) (including the Anti-Director Rights Index in the calculation of financial  
integration). 
48 See Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al., Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization:  Re-
gional and International Evidence, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 903 (2003) (using the indices as 
part of a study of industrial specialization). 
49 See La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1127-28. 
50 Id. at 1127. 
51 Id. at 1128. 
52 Id.
53 Id.  In addition to the Anti-Director Rights Index, LLSV also take into account 
two variables:  “one share, one vote” and “mandatory dividends.”  See La Porta et al., 
supra note 13, at 1122-23. 
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To be sure, as we will discuss in Part II, these voting arrangements 
may not be the most important governance provisions even in NCS 
companies, but they do provide some protection for outside investors 
in such companies.  This is not the case for CS companies.  Thus, the 
Anti-Director Rights Index well illustrates our thesis concerning the 
problems involved in using investor-protection measures that purport 
to apply to all companies regardless of their ownership structure.54
2.  The Anti-Self-Dealing Index
Three of the designers of the Anti-Director Rights Index recently 
teamed with a World Bank economist (together commonly referred to 
as DLLS) to develop a new index.55  The DLLS team offered this Anti-
Self-Dealing Index as a superior alternative to the Anti-Director Rights 
Index.56  Although relatively new, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index has al-
ready been used significantly in research by financial economists.57
54 Commentators have questioned the Anti-Director Rights Index on a variety of 
grounds.  Some argue that the index does not capture all the arrangements that are 
important for investor protection.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Owner-
ship:  The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1, 4 n.6 (2001) (arguing that the shareholder rights captured by LLSV “supply 
only partial and sometimes easily outflanked safeguards, which have little to do with 
the protection of control and the entitlement to a control premium”).  Others argue 
that the index adopts a U.S.-centric approach.  See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, 
Shareholder Protection:  A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17, 20-21 (2007) (not-
ing that the inclusion of variables like cumulative voting and the exclusion of vari-
ables like director entrenchment reflect a U.S. bias).  Lawyers have been skeptical of 
the attempt to use a single measure for evaluating the quality of legal protection 
across countries and have identified some mistakes.  See, e.g., Udo C. Braendle, 
Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—“Law and Finance” Revisited, 7 GERMAN 
L.J. 257, 258 (2006) (arguing that LLSV did not adequately consider German com-
pany law); Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter?  Some Evidence from Milan, 3 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 765, 769-83 (2002) (U.K.) (evaluating differences between 
corporate law on and off the books and the impact of enforcement).  Others explore 
the methodological difficulties associated with coding such legal variables. See, e.g.,
Spamann, supra note 14 (attempting, and failing, to replicate the data presented by 
LLSV).  Our thesis, however, is markedly different.  We argue that any attempt to 
develop a single measure for evaluating corporate governance for both controlled 
and widely held firms is inherently misguided. 
55 Djankov et al., supra note 13. 
56 See id. at 432 (discussing improvements vis-à-vis the Anti-Director Rights Index). 
57 See Doidge et al., supra note 17, at 16 (using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index as a 
measure of investor rights); Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance 
and Regulation:  Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? 14 (European Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 142/2007, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
956329 (using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index as a measure of investor protection); Augusto 
de la Torre et al., Capital Market Development:  Whither Latin America?, 7 (World Bank Pol-
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This index focuses on the extent to which outside investors are 
protected from expropriation by insiders using self-dealing transac-
tions, and it includes measures such as disclosure, public enforce-
ment, approval of self-dealing transactions by disinterested sharehold-
ers, shareholders’ legal standing to challenge a self-dealing 
transaction in court, and the ability to hold controlling shareholders 
and directors liable for self-dealing transactions.58  The DLLS team ar-
gued that the Anti-Self-Dealing Index is theoretically grounded and 
found it to be a more robust predictor of the development of stock 
markets than the Anti-Director Rights Index.59
As we shall explain below, however, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
also cannot provide an adequate yardstick for assessing investor pro-
tection around the world.  Whereas the Anti-Director Rights Index 
was shaped largely by reasoning relevant to investor protection for 
NCS companies, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index focuses on measures 
relevant primarily to CS companies.  As a result, the Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index ignores dimensions that are quite important for investor pro-
tection in NCS companies.  To be sure, CS firms are presumably 
dominant in most countries.  Yet, as Part III will explain, researchers 
assessing a country’s level of investor protection should keep separate 
scores for how well it protects outside investors at CS firms and how 
well it protects such investors at NCS firms.  
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between ownership 
structure—that is, the presence or absence of a controlling share-
holder—and investor protection.  As we will explain, differences in 
ownership structure affect the nature of problems that outside inves-
tors face and, in turn, the measures that could be most effective in 
addressing these problems. 
Section A begins by describing the fundamental differences be-
tween CS and NCS companies.  We then analyze the implications of 
these differences for different areas of corporate governance.  Specifi-
icy Res. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4156, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=967890 (same). 
58 For a detailed description, see Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 433-36. 
59 See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 44, at 294 (“[A] two–standard 
deviation increase in the anti-self-dealing index is associated with an increase in the 
stock-market-to-GDP ratio of 42 percentage points, an increase in listed firms per capita 
of 38 percent, and a reduction in ownership concentration of 6 percentage points.”). 
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cally, we discuss control contests (Section B), voting procedures (Sec-
tion C), the allocation of power between the board and shareholders 
(Section D), the allocation of power between majority and minority 
shareholders (Section E), director independence (Section F), and ar-
rangements governing potential value diversion (Section G). 
A.  Some Fundamental Differences Between CS and NCS Companies 
We begin with some general observations about the fundamental 
dissimilarities between CS and NCS companies.  In particular, we fo-
cus on differences in terms of (1) the nature of the agency problem 
for outside investors, (2) the contestability of control, (3) the ability of 
a majority of shareholders to exercise their formal power, and (4) the 
main ways in which opportunism benefits insiders.
1.  Nature of the Agency Problem
When outside investors provide capital to a public firm, they face 
the risk that the insiders who influence the firm’s decisions will act 
opportunistically and advance their own private interests.  Although 
this general problem exists in both CS and NCS firms, these firms dif-
fer in the identity of the insiders from whom outside investors need 
protection.
In NCS companies, shareholders’ inability to use effectively their 
power to monitor officers and directors (to whom we refer collectively 
as “management”) provides management with a significant measure of 
de facto control.  Because management’s interests may diverge from 
those of shareholders, the fundamental concern that governance ar-
rangements need to address is management’s potential to behave op-
portunistically at the expense of shareholders.60
In CS companies, in contrast, controlling shareholders commonly 
have both the effective means to monitor management and the incen-
tives to do so.61  Thus, to the extent that the controllers have some in-
terests in common with those of outside investors, the controller’s 
60 For an in-depth analysis of the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
management in NCS firms, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976). 
61 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:  Complicating 
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (“[A] controlling share-
holder may police the management of public corporations better than the standard 
panoply of market-oriented techniques employed when shareholdings are widely held.”). 
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presence lessens the concern that management will act contrary to 
these interests.  Controllers, however, may also have interests that do 
not overlap with those of outside investors, and they may use their 
power to advance such interests.  In CS companies, therefore, the 
fundamental concern that needs to be addressed by governance ar-
rangements is the controlling shareholder’s opportunism.62
2.  Contestability of Control
In CS companies, control is not contestable.  The controlling 
shareholder has a lock on control by virtue of its ownership of a ma-
jority of the voting rights—or at least a sufficient percentage of voting 
rights to secure an effective lock on control.  In NCS companies, in 
contrast, control is at least in theory contestable, though the extent to 
which it is contestable in practice depends on the governance ar-
rangements that we will discuss later. 
The difference in contestability has important implications for 
corporate governance.  When an active market for corporate control 
exists, insiders are subject to the threat of removal if they fail to 
maximize shareholder value.  This disciplinary mechanism, the 
strength of which depends on the governance arrangements in place, 
can enhance share value and reduce the need for other mechanisms 
for constraining management.  In CS companies, however, the threat 
of a control contest does not exist and cannot constrain insider op-
portunism. 
3.  Ability of a Majority of Shareholders to 
Exercise Their Formal Power 
In NCS companies, governance arrangements must be assessed 
against the background of collective action and free-rider problems 
that often prevent outside shareholders from effectively using whatever 
formal powers that they have to constrain and influence manage-
ment.63  Consider a shareholder with a one-percent stake who is con-
templating whether to take an action that would enhance share value.  
The shareholder may be discouraged by the prospect of having to bear 
the full cost of taking such an action while capturing only one percent 
62 See also Enriques & Volpin, supra note 11, at 117 (“[C]oncentrated ownership 
can create conditions for a new agency problem, because the interests of controlling 
and minority shareholders are not aligned.”). 
63 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 66-67 (1991). 
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of the benefits.  The arrangements governing NCS companies must be 
assessed against the background of collective action and free-rider 
problems.  Put differently, one generally cannot assume that outside 
shareholders holding a majority of the shares collectively will use their 
formal powers to advance the course of action that they prefer. 
In CS companies, in contrast, the controller is likely to use its for-
mal powers to maximize the value of the shares it owns.  The control-
ler will generally capture at least a significant share of the apprecia-
tion in value that these actions produce and thus will have significant 
incentives to exercise power.64  Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume 
that controllers will make significant use of their formal powers to ad-
vance the course of action that they prefer.
4.  The Main Ways in Which Opportunism Benefits Insiders 
CS and NCS companies differ not only in the identity of the insid-
ers whose potential opportunism should be constrained, but also in 
the main ways in which insider opportunism is manifested.  Compared 
to professional managers in NCS companies, controllers often have 
extra avenues for diverting significant value. 
Controllers are often individuals or firms that have businesses 
other than the public firm in question and considerable outside 
wealth.  This is especially true in the many countries in which a rela-
tively small number of dominant families controls many public com-
panies through pyramids and other forms of business groups.65  In 
contrast, professional managers at NCS companies are less likely to 
own—fully or partly—significant businesses outside the public com-
pany that they manage.  The ownership of significant outside busi-
nesses provides controllers with additional ways to divert value.66  For 
controlling shareholders, large self-dealing transactions with other en-
64 Moreover, for a holder of the majority of the votes, the cost of monitoring and 
disciplining management is likely to be lower than it is for outside shareholders.  For 
example, directors and officers are more likely to provide a controlling shareholder 
with information concerning the company’s performance, and the controller does not 
need to communicate with other shareholders to secure a majority of the votes. 
65 See, e.g., Faccio & Lang, supra note 10, at 390 tbl.8 (presenting evidence on the 
prevalence of pyramidal ownership structures in Western Europe); Khanna & Yafeh, 
supra note 10, at 332 (“[I]n virtually all emerging markets, group affiliated firms tend 
to be relatively large and economically important.”). 
66 See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling (Univ. of Tex. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 117, 2008), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1030529 (discussing the different ways in which controlling persons 
may extract wealth from firms). 
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tities affiliated with them and freezeout transactions often provide an 
important channel for extracting private benefits.67
Diversion of value through executive compensation, however, is a 
concern of lesser importance in CS companies than in NCS compa-
nies.  First, to the extent that the company’s executives are profes-
sional managers not affiliated with the controller, the controller gen-
erally has an interest in setting executive compensation to maximize 
shareholder value.68  Second, even when individuals affiliated with the 
controller serve in a managerial capacity, the controller may well elect 
not to maximize diversion through excessive compensation, given its 
ability to extract private benefits on a larger scale through other 
means, such as related-party transactions.69
There is yet another related difference in the ways that insider 
opportunism manifests itself in CS and NCS companies.  Managerial 
shirking and empire building are more serious concerns in NCS com-
panies than in CS companies.70  Such practices provide insiders with 
67 For evidence on self-dealing involving companies within the same business 
groups, see, for example, Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added?  Evidence from 
Mergers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002); Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting 
Out Tunneling:  An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 Q.J. ECON. 121 (2002).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of legal issues that arise in the context of freezeout transactions, 
see generally Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2 (2005). 
68 Controllers might use generous compensation arrangements to induce manag-
ers to facilitate controllers’ value diversion through self-dealing and other transactions.  
Controllers, however, are often quite influential in making a decision to hire or termi-
nate managers.  This means that managers who want to get hired or keep their job 
have an incentive to cater to the controller preferences even without being paid for 
their cooperation with value diversion.
69 Another difference is the role of directors’ stock ownership.  In NCS compa-
nies, stock ownership can incentivize outside directors to monitor management.  See,
e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864 (1993) (arguing that encouraging directors to hold 
substantial equity interests would provide better oversight incentives).  But see Assaf 
Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677,
1682-83 (2007) (arguing that equity pay for directors “cannot substitute for direct 
monitoring incentives”). In CS firms, however, directors’ stock ownership might be 
less important.  If the director is the controller or its affiliate, then equity ownership is 
unlikely to provide incentives beyond those already provided by owning the control 
block.  Even when the director is independent, however, the incentives provided 
through stock ownership are likely outweighed by the controller’s influence over direc-
tor elections. 
70 See Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, The One Share–One Vote Debate:  A Theoretical Per-
spective 28 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 176/2007, 
2007) (“In spite of stock option plans and the like, compensation packages for top ex-
ecutives typically dwindle in comparison to the equity stakes of most large owners.”). 
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nonpecuniary benefits while reducing share value,71 and a controller 
with a large ownership stake will bear a substantial fraction of the 
costs.  A controlling shareholder therefore has an incentive to avoid 
such actions when managing the company72 and to prevent them 
when the company is run by professional managers.  Thus, in the 
presence of a controller with a large ownership stake, managerial 
shirking and empire building are relatively less important concerns. 
*      *      * 
With these four fundamental differences in mind, we now con-
sider the relationship between ownership structure and several key 
sets of governance arrangements.  As our analysis will demonstrate, 
one should distinguish between CS and NCS companies when assess-
ing each of these key sets of governance arrangements.
B. Control Contests 
1.  The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies 
One important difference between CS and NCS companies con-
cerns the potential role of battles for corporate control—that is, hos-
tile takeover bids and proxy contests.  Although such contests and the 
governance arrangements regulating them are quite important for 
NCS companies, they are largely irrelevant to CS companies. 
Anyone approaching governance arrangements from a U.S. per-
spective finds it natural to assume that the arrangements governing 
control contests are a key element in the governance of public com-
panies.  After all, these arrangements have long occupied a central 
role in discussions of corporate and securities laws by academics and 
policymakers in the United States.73  Textbooks or treatises on United 
States corporate law devote substantial space to arrangements govern-
71 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (“Managers have incentives to cause their 
firms to grow beyond the optimal size.”). 
72 See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy:  Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior 
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (finding that firms whose CEOs per-
sonally use company jets underperform market benchmarks). 
73 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002) (“In the last thirty years, takeover law has been the subject 
most hotly debated by corporate law scholars.”). 
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ing takeovers and proxy fights .74  Lawmakers have devoted consider-
able legislative effort to enacting antitakeover statutes and promulgat-
ing regulatory rules governing tender offers and control contests.75
The Delaware courts have developed an extensive body of takeover 
case law.76  Numerous studies by legal scholars, as well as financial 
economists, focus on the arrangements governing hostile bids and 
proxy fights.77  And investors have devoted considerable attention to 
antitakeover defenses and have made them the subject of a large frac-
tion of all shareholder proposals.78
The dominant view among U.S. scholars and shareholder advisers 
is that firms should adopt governance arrangements that facilitate 
control contests.79  Because the threat of a hostile takeover or a proxy 
fight is commonly viewed as providing an important market-based 
check on management, a vibrant market for corporate control can re-
duce the agency problem underlying NCS firms.80  This view is sup-
ported by a substantial body of empirical evidence indicating that ex-
posure to the threat of a hostile takeover is associated with higher firm 
value and better performance.81  Such evidence has led U.S. academics 
74 See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATIONS 315-24, 1040-1114 (9th ed. 2005). 
75 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:  Lessons from His-
tory, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1801-02 (2006) (describing three decades of state anti-
takeover legislation). 
76 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for De-
fensive Tactics:  Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 248 (1989) 
(analyzing the standard of review applied by the Delaware courts to defensive measures 
taken by the target board). 
77 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (criticizing 
managerial resistance to premium tender offers); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations:  The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819, 819-21 (1981) (noting the conflict of interest that managers face in the tender-
offer setting and proposing a structural solution); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The 
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982) (advocating a 
rule of auctioneering to promote competition among premium tender offers). 
78 See GEORGESON, 2007 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 6 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2007.pdf (noting that, 
while currently in decline, shareholder proposals addressing antitakeover defenses have 
dominated the proxy landscape for years). 
79 We share this view.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 75, at 1805-07. 
80 See Henry G. Manne, Op-Ed., Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2002, at A18 (“New scandals will continue until we bring back the most powerful mar-
ket mechanism for displacing bad managers:  hostile takeovers.”). 
81 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage 
Setting?  A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535, 545 (1999) (finding 
that the adoption of antitakeover statutes led to higher labor costs); Kenneth A. 
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to use the extent to which control is contestable as a standard measure 
of a firm’s quality of corporate governance.82
For similar reasons, proxy contests also can play an important role 
in disciplining managers of NCS companies.  U.S. law provides a vari-
ety of arrangements to regulate and facilitate such contests, including 
allowing insurgents to reimburse their expenses in the event that they 
gain control, providing shareholders with some access to the com-
pany’s proxy machinery, and preventing fraud and manipulation of 
voting.83  And Delaware courts have expressed their willingness to in-
tervene when management has tried to adopt measures impeding 
proxy contests.84
To be sure, some U.S. scholars and practitioners believe that ex-
posing managers to control contests may be counterproductive and 
produce short-termism as well as wasteful distraction for manage-
ment.85  But even those who support insulating boards from control 
contests share the views that the arrangements governing hostile bids 
and proxy challenges are important and that the choice of such ar-
rangements can significantly affect—for better or worse—firm value. 
In contrast, the arrangements governing control contests are 
largely irrelevant to CS companies.  When a company has a majority 
Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495, 1515 
(1997) (stating that executives with stronger antitakeover defenses enjoy higher com-
pensation levels); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate 
Control:  The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (re-
porting that antitakeover statutes “allow managers to pursue goals other than maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth”); Gompers et al., supra note 22, at 111, 129 (concluding that 
companies with managers who enjoy more protection from takeovers are associated 
with poorer operating performance). 
82 See Bhagat et al., supra note 5, at 1811-12 (“Firms that adopt devices to impede 
control changes are . . . conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate gov-
ernance, because the managers of those firms are not subject to the disciplining force 
of hostile bids.”); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 22 (measuring corporate govern-
ance quality based on provisions that affect entrenchment); Gompers et al., supra note 
22, at 111 (using voting rights, director/officer protection, and the ability to delay hos-
tile bidders as measures of corporate governance). 
83 For a review of these mechanisms, see WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ch. 7 (2d ed. 2007). 
84 See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660-62 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(holding that a board action with the primary purpose of interfering with the share-
holder franchise must be supported by a “compelling justification”). 
85 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 
1039 (2002) (arguing that there are substantial costs to having companies constantly 
subjected to control contests); Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower:  How Academ-
ics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1436 (2005) (supporting 
Lipton’s thesis both positively and normatively).
1288 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1263
shareholder, or at least a controller with an effective lock on control, 
the management team supported by the controller cannot be re-
placed even in the absence of any impediments to hostile bids and 
proxy fights:  the controller simply has enough votes to prevent the 
team’s removal.86  For the level of investor protection at CS compa-
nies, therefore, the presence of arrangements providing protection 
against a hostile takeover or a proxy fight is neither good nor bad, but 
simply irrelevant.87
2.  Treatment by Governance Standards 
We have seen that the arrangements governing control contests 
are important for NCS companies but not for CS companies.  These 
arrangements should therefore get substantial weight in assessing the 
governance of NCS companies but not of CS companies.  It follows 
that any governance-rating system that assigns a given weight to the 
arrangements that govern control contests, without distinguishing be-
tween CS and NCS companies, is bound to overweight this factor in 
assessing CS companies, underweight it in assessing NCS companies, 
or both. 
Consider first RiskMetrics’s CGQ system.  Regardless of a com-
pany’s ownership structure, this system assigns considerable weight to 
companies’ antitakeover arrangements.  Antitakeover provisions are 
one of the eight categories of factors in the CGQ’s list of rated fac-
tors.88  The factors included in this category represent a significant 
fraction of the rated factors for both U.S. and non-U.S. firms:  for U.S. 
firms, six out of more than sixty factors focus on poison pill features, 
86 See Gilson, supra note 61, at 1667-68 (discussing the economic implications of 
inefficient controllers’ failure to relinquish control); Randall K. Morck et al., Inherited 
Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth:  The Canadian Disease?, in CONCEN-
TRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 319 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (same). 
87 Although the rules governing control contests do not affect significantly the 
level of investor protection at CS firms, it should be noted that such rules can affect 
founders’ initial decision whether to retain a control block.   When control is contest-
able, entrepreneurs with substantial private benefits of control are less likely to relin-
quish control to the market when taking their companies public.  See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=203110. 
88 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶ 34.  The U.S. CGQ crite-
ria refer to this category as “State of Incorporation.”  See RISKMETRICS, U.S. CRITERIA,
supra note 42.
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while seven other factors focus on state antitakeover provisions.89  For 
non-U.S. firms, seven rating provisions out of fifty-five in the list of 
rated factors focus on features of the company’s poison pill and take-
over defenses.90
Although the CGQ systems attach substantial weight to antitake-
over provisions in rating both U.S. and non-U.S. firms, in neither case 
do they distinguish between CS and NCS firms.  In both cases, a com-
pany with a controlling shareholder can receive a perfect score on all 
the antitakeover variables, thus substantially increasing its overall gov-
ernance ranking, even though the absence of defenses against a hos-
tile bid is irrelevant in protecting outside investors in such a company. 
Like the CGQ system, the Anti-Director Rights Index also gives 
significant weight to arrangements that could affect control contests.  
As noted earlier, it assigns considerable weight to three arrangements 
concerning shareholder voting:  shareholders’ rights to call a special 
meeting, to vote by mail, and to vote without depositing shares.91  Al-
though each of these arrangements can sometimes facilitate the wrest-
ing of control from the incumbent directors of an NCS company, 
these provisions are probably not the most important arrangements 
with respect to control contests; the Anti-Director Rights Index does 
not consider, for example, whether management can use a poison 
pill.  But while the three arrangements given weight by the index can 
affect the extent to which control contests are facilitated and are thus 
relevant to assessing the governance of NCS companies, they have lit-
tle relevance to assessing the governance of CS companies. 
The Anti-Self-Dealing Index suffers from the opposite shortcom-
ing.  Unlike the Anti-Director Rights Index, it includes none of the 
governance arrangements that affect the extent to which control con-
tests are facilitated or impeded.92  This feature does not undermine 
the index’s usefulness for assessing the governance of CS companies, 
but does undermine it in the case of NCS companies. 
89 See RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 42, ¶¶ 27–32, at 18-21 (giving 
standards for poison pill adoption, shareholder approval, and trigger level, among 
other things); id. ¶¶ 40–46, at 26-27 (giving standards for state antitakeover law). 
90 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶¶ 22–27, 34.  Note that we 
do not have information concerning the relative weight that RiskMetrics assigns to each 
governance measure for purposes of generating a company’s ultimate CGQ score. 
91 See La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1122 tbl.1; see also supra subsection I.C.1. 
92 See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1.
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C. Voting Procedures 
1.  The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
Corporate law statutes typically include detailed procedures that 
govern shareholder voting.93  These often-technical rules aim to facili-
tate the ability of a majority of shareholders to express their prefer-
ences by voting on certain issues.  These rules affect the cost of casting 
a vote—for example, by allowing shareholders to vote by mail or proxy 
or by requiring shareholders to deposit their shares before voting.  
They also affect the extent to which voting outcomes accurately reflect 
the undistorted opinions of a majority of shareholders—for example, 
by regulating broker-voting and confidential-voting arrangements.94
In addition, the rules affect shareholders’ ability to act in a timely 
manner by calling a special meeting or by acting by written consent.  
Finally, voting rules can facilitate shareholders’ ability to influence 
management by specifying the conditions under which shareholder 
proposals must be included in the company’s proxy materials and the 
issues on which such proposals may be submitted.95
The arrangements that govern shareholder voting can be quite 
important for investor protection at NCS companies.  In these com-
panies, shareholders’ power to elect directors and to vote on other 
fundamental issues has long been considered one of the key mecha-
nisms for aligning management’s and shareholders’ interests.  Al-
though some of the rules governing shareholder voting may appear to 
deal mainly with technicalities, they can affect voting outcomes sig-
nificantly.  For example, a shareholder with a limited stake may not 
initiate a proposal to amend the company’s bylaws—even if the pro-
posal is likely to win majority support—unless the shareholder has the 
right to have the proposal included in the company’s proxy materials.  
For similar reasons, shareholders may not bother to vote for a pro-
93 For a review of the arrangements governing shareholder voting under U.S. fed-
eral law and state corporate statutes, see generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 83, ch. 7. 
94 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1227, 1250 (2008) (discussing the ability of brokers to use their discretion to 
vote shares when proxy materials are not delivered). 
95 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 61-63 (2003) (arguing that changing proxy rules to increase shareholder access to 
voting will reduce management’s insulation).  But see Martin Lipton & Steven A. 
Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy:  An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 
BUS. LAW. 67, 83-84 (2003) (arguing that elections are disruptive of the company’s 
time and resources). 
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posal that they support (or against a proposal that they oppose) if 
casting a vote is too costly or burdensome.  Because some outside 
shareholders may decide not to vote their shares, brokers can have a 
significant influence on vote outcomes.96  Finally, confidential voting 
may make a difference when some shareholders fear retaliation if they 
vote against the company’s incumbent directors.97
Given the foundational role of shareholder voting, some U.S. 
scholars and shareholder advisers believe that it is desirable to facili-
tate the ability of a majority of the shareholders to express their 
views.98  To be sure, some of those who support insulating boards from 
control contests hold the opposite view.99  But all commentators would 
agree that the arrangements governing shareholder voting are likely 
to be consequential, one way or another, especially with the recent in-
crease of institutional-shareholder activism.100
In CS companies, in contrast, the rules governing voting proce-
dures are likely to be inconsequential.  Controllers—unaffected by the 
collective action and free-rider problems that discourage action by 
dispersed shareholders—will exercise their voting power even without 
rules to facilitate shareholder voting.  Furthermore, as long as a con-
troller has enough votes to determine voting outcomes,101 even rules 
that facilitate voting by minority shareholders will not enable them to 
pass resolutions not favored by the controller.
96 See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
pwg_report.pdf (discussing the significant influence of broker votes in “routine” mat-
ters such as “just vote no” campaigns). 
97 But see Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
465, 465-67 (2003) (reporting evidence that the adoption of confidential voting has no 
significant effect on voting outcomes). 
98 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that allowing shareholders to intervene in major 
corporate decisions will improve overall corporate governance). 
99 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (challenging the proposal to empower shareholders as 
not inherently value enhancing and arguing to retain the current regime of limited 
shareholder voting rights). 
100 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power:  
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 477 (2008) (“The 
ability of . . . institutional actors to coordinate at a much lower cost changes the collec-
tive action equation and rejuvenates a shareholder activism that depends on voting as a 
credible mechanism for shareholder influence, even outside of a control contest.”); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 94, at 1229 (“Never has voting been more important in cor-
porate law.”). 
101 We discuss majority-of-minority voting conditions in the next Section. 
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2.  Treatment by Governance Standards 
The CGQ rating system includes two factors concerning voting 
procedures—shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting and share-
holders’ ability to act by written consent.102  Similarly, the Anti-Director 
Rights Index includes three components related to shareholder vot-
ing—voting by mail, voting without depositing shares, and the mini-
mum ownership required to call a special shareholder meeting.103
As explained above, shareholder voting arrangements are impor-
tant for investor protection at NCS companies but not at CS compa-
nies.  Measures that enable minority shareholders to call a special 
meeting, act by written consent, vote by mail, or vote without deposit-
ing shares are unlikely to provide effective constraints on opportunism 
by controlling shareholders.  The fact that the CGQ system and the 
Anti-Director Rights Index give significant weight to voting procedures 
thus undermines their effectiveness in assessing governance in CS 
companies (or countries with a significant presence of CS companies). 
In contrast to the CGQ rating system and the Anti-Director Rights 
Index, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index gives no weight to voting arrange-
ments.104  That feature of the index does not affect its usefulness for 
assessing governance of CS companies. It does, however, undermine 
its effectiveness in assessing corporate governance at NCS companies 
(or countries in which NCS companies are common). 
D.  Allocation of Power Between the Board and Shareholders 
1.  The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies
In recent years, researchers and investors have paid significant at-
tention to mechanisms strengthening shareholders’ ability to have 
their preferences followed by the board—that is, measures reducing 
the extent to which the board is insulated from shareholder wishes.105
Because the primary agency problem in NCS companies is that man-
agement’s interests may diverge from those of shareholders, arrange-
102 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. CRITERIA, supra note 42, ¶¶ 30–31. 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 49-54. 
104 See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1. 
105 See Bebchuk, supra note 98, at 870 (arguing that the current system of corpo-
rate governance, in which shareholder-initiated change is ruled out, demands reform); 
see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (“Recently shareholders have launched an aggressive campaign to 
increase their voting power within the corporation.”). 
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ments making it difficult for the board to disregard shareholder pref-
erences can enhance investor protection in such companies. 
Indeed, the arrangements facilitating hostile takeovers and proxy 
fights, which we discussed in Section B, can be viewed as mechanisms 
that enable shareholders to have their preferences followed when they 
wish to sell the company or replace its management.  The prospect of 
removal in a control contest or a proxy fight may induce directors to 
follow shareholder preferences on various other matters.  Nonethe-
less, directors and officers may be more likely to follow shareholder 
preferences if shareholders can express those preferences on matters 
other than takeovers or director elections.106
Scholars, shareholder advisers, and policymakers have advocated a 
variety of measures that strengthen shareholders’ ability to influence 
board decisions.  One set of proposals aims at enhancing shareholder 
influence on the “rules of the game”—the company’s governance ar-
rangements.107  Examples include measures preventing the board from 
amending the bylaws (or at least shareholder-adopted bylaws) without 
shareholder approval, enabling shareholders to place proposals for 
governance changes on the company’s proxy statement, or encourag-
ing the board to implement majority-passed shareholder proposals. 
Other measures concerning the allocation of power between 
shareholders and the board are those that provide shareholders with a 
say on specific business decisions.  For example, the so-called “say on 
pay” arrangements, which were adopted by legislation in the United 
Kingdom and Australia,108 as well as by some companies in the United 
States,109 enable shareholders to express their views on the company’s 
compensation policy.  The same approach has been adopted in the 
106 See Bebchuk, supra note 98, at 856-61 (explaining why the power to replace 
management is insufficient to allow shareholders to have their wishes followed). 
107 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1784 (2006) (proposing to allow shareholders to make rules-of-the-game decisions and 
addressing counterarguments thereto); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, 
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 208 (2005) 
(“[S]hareholder bylaws regulating corporate governance are desirable.”). 
108 See Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell:  Lessons from International Statutory Re-
gimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 829 & n.66 (2008) (describing a reform, enacted in Austra-
lia and the United Kingdom and also recommended for the United States by the Paulson 
Committee, granting shareholders an annual advisory vote on employee compensation). 
109 See Claudia H. Deutsch, Say on Pay:  A Whisper or a Shout for Shareholders?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at BU9 (“The votes on compensation may be nonbinding, but 
they are still popular.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Verizon Shareholders To Vote on Pay for Top 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C8 (reporting Verizon’s decision to put its ex-
ecutive-compensation arrangements to a shareholder vote). 
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United States by stock-exchange requirements that shareholders ap-
prove certain option plans.110  Finally, some measures empower share-
holders to influence the composition of the board without a control 
contest.  This category includes majority voting (enabling sharehold-
ers to oppose the election of underperforming directors even though 
there are no challengers on the ballot),111 shareholder access to the 
ballot (empowering shareholders to use the company’s proxy state-
ment to nominate a small number of directors),112 and shareholder 
power to determine the size of the board or to fill board vacancies. 
Some opponents believe that such measures may adversely affect 
outside investors in NCS companies.113  Yet there is no dispute that the 
allocation of power between boards and shareholders can have a sub-
stantial impact (for better or worse) on outside investors in such com-
panies.  These arrangements are likely to significantly influence cor-
porate decisions by affecting the extent to which directors and officers 
are attuned to the preferences of the majority of shareholders. 
In CS companies, in contrast, such arrangements are unlikely to 
have significant consequences.  Given their ability to elect directors, 
controllers can usually have boards follow their preferences even with-
out the measures designed to enable dispersed shareholders to over-
come their collective action problems.  Consider, for example, share-
holders’ rights to have their governance proposals or board nominees 
appear on the company’s proxy materials for a shareholder meeting.  
Given the collective action problems that they face, dispersed share-
110 See Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes Relating to 
Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 
( July 3, 2003) (requiring shareholder approval of all equity compensation plans and 
material revisions thereto). 
111 For a comprehensive analysis of majority voting and the legal issues that this 
regime raises, see J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie?  Majority Vot-
ing, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW.
1007 (2007). 
112 See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 211-12 (reviewing recent efforts by institu-
tional shareholders to propose bylaw amendments concerning director nomination). 
113 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 574 (2006) (arguing that increasing shareholder power might encourage 
shareholders to advance what is in their own—not the company’s—best interests); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 (2006) (arguing that active shareholder involvement would 
disrupt the centralization of decision-making authority in the board of directors); Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic:  A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solu-
tion for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764-66 (2006) (expanding 
on the traditionalist view that the incentives of institutional investors differ significantly 
from those of individual stockholders). 
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holders may not engage in the costly process of soliciting proxies for 
their proposal or board nominee, even when such a proposal is likely 
to receive significant shareholder support.  Controlling shareholders, 
on the other hand, typically have no difficulty making the board in-
clude their proposals or nominees on the company’s ballot, and can 
in any event bring the proposals that they favor to a vote at the share-
holder meeting even if, for some reason, those proposals were not in-
cluded in the company’s proxy materials. 
Similarly, even without formal requirements of shareholder ap-
proval or advisory vote, directors in CS companies are unlikely to de-
cide important issues, such as the CEO’s compensation package, with-
out getting the controller’s implicit or explicit consent or at least a 
sense of the controller’s views on the matter.  Likewise, even without 
formal requirements to give weight to shareholder preferences ex-
pressed in a nonbinding proposal, a board effectively elected by a con-
trolling shareholder is unlikely to disregard such shareholder’s pref-
erences (or at least those preferences that the controller chooses to 
express).114
Most importantly, whereas making directors follow the prefer-
ences of the majority of shareholders may enhance the protection of 
outside investors in NCS companies, it cannot be expected to do so in 
CS companies.  In CS companies, outside investors’ main concern is 
not that management will make decisions that diverge from the inter-
ests of the majority of the shareholders, but rather that management 
will make decisions that divert value from outside investors to the con-
trolling shareholder.  Given the nature of the agency problem in CS 
companies, measures that increase the board’s adherence to the ma-
jority shareholder’s preferences would exacerbate—rather than allevi-
ate—the risk of controller opportunism.  Thus, in CS companies, giv-
ing the majority of shareholders more power vis-à-vis the board would 
operate to weaken—not enhance—the protection of outside investors. 
The measures that we considered earlier in this Section therefore 
cannot improve the protection of minority shareholders in CS com-
panies.  Indeed, they might even undermine it.  By contrast, measures 
that insulate the board of an NCS company from following the prefer-
ences of the majority of shareholders might actually enable the board 
114 In some rare cases, a conflict may arise between the board and controlling 
shareholders. See Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1088-89 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(approving board action to install a poison pill in order to prevent the controlling 
shareholder—who was suspected of fraud—from selling its control block), aff’d, 872 
A.2d 559 (Del. 2005). 
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of a CS company to counterbalance the controller’s power and even 
constrain controller opportunism.115
2.  Treatment by Governance Standards 
We now examine how the leading governance metrics treat meas-
ures that increase the power of the majority of shareholders to influ-
ence corporate decision making.  The CGQ system grades positively 
the presence of four arrangements concerning shareholder power:  
requiring that shareholders annually ratify management’s selection of 
an auditor,116 requiring that shareholders vote on new poison pills and 
material amendments to existing ones,117 requiring shareholder ap-
proval for any bylaw amendments,118 and requiring responsiveness to 
shareholder proposals passed with majority support.119
Although such measures may benefit outside investors in NCS 
companies, they are likely to have little practical relevance for CS 
companies.  Consider the provisions calling for shareholders to ratify 
the choice of auditors or board actions to amend the bylaws.  Even 
when directors of a CS company have the formal power to select audi-
tors or amend the bylaws without shareholder approval, they are 
unlikely to make decisions in these matters that are opposed by the 
controller.120  Furthermore, even assuming that formal approval re-
quirements would provide the controller with more power over auditor 
115 This might be especially true for arrangements that make it difficult for a con-
troller to fire directors quickly.  While they might lead to entrenchment and exacer-
bate the problem of insider opportunism in an NCS company, measures that make it 
difficult for the majority of shareholders to fire the board might provide the board in a 
CS company with some independence from the controller. 
116 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶ 21, at 13 
(“Shareholders should be permitted to ratify management’s selection of auditors each 
year.”). 
117 See id. ¶ 22, at 13 (“Shareholders should be permitted to approve shareholder 
rights plans (i.e., poison pills).”). 
118 See id. ¶ 32, at 17 (“Management should not be permitted to amend the bylaws 
without shareholder approval.”). 
119 See id. ¶ 14, at 10 (“Management should take action on all shareholder propos-
als supported by a majority vote within 12 months of the shareholders’ meeting.”).  
Though the standard calls on the board to take action within twelve months, the action 
does not have to be implementation.  Either partial implementation or issuance of an 
analysis explaining why the board does not implement seems to be within the take-
action standard.  What the standard opposes is just ignoring the passed proposal. 
120 We should note, however, that there are rare cases in which boards decide to 
take active steps against controlling shareholders.  See supra note 114. 
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selection or bylaw amendments, it is doubtful that such a change 
would enhance the protection of outside investors. 
The CGQ rating system also grades positively several provisions 
that strengthen the ability of the majority of shareholders to determine 
who will serve on the board.  These provisions include annual board 
elections,121 shareholder approval for changes in board size,122 share-
holder power to fill board vacancies,123 shareholder power to act by 
written consent,124 and shareholder power to call a special meeting.125
These provisions—which we discussed earlier as facilitating control 
contests—also enhance shareholder influence over board composition 
in the absence of a control contest.  Thus, they increase the extent to 
which directors are accountable to the majority of shareholders.  But 
even though making directors more accountable to the majority of 
shareholders may constrain management’s opportunism in NCS com-
panies, it cannot address controller opportunism in CS companies, 
and it may even undermine the ability and willingness of directors in 
such companies to serve as a check on the controller. 
One of the six key provisions of the Anti-Director Rights Index fo-
cuses on shareholder power to call a special meeting.  This power en-
hances the ability of the majority of shareholders to have their prefer-
ences followed.  But having the power to call a special meeting does 
not materially affect the balance of power in CS companies.  The fact 
that the Anti-Director Rights Index gives significant weight to the 
presence of an arrangement that is largely inconsequential for outside 
investors in CS companies undermines the index’s effectiveness as an 
accurate measure of investor protection in countries where such com-
panies dominate. 
121 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶ 5, at 7 
(“Directors should be accountable to shareholders on an annual basis.”). 
122 See id. ¶ 7, at 7 (“Shareholders have the right to vote on changes to expand or 
contract the size of the board.”). 
123 See id. ¶ 16, at 10-11 (“Shareholders should be given an opportunity to vote on 
all directors selected to fill vacancies.”). 
124 See id. ¶ 30, at 16 (“Shareholders should be permitted to act by written consent.”). 
125 See id. ¶ 31, at 16-17 (“Shareholders should be permitted to call special  
meetings.”).
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E.  Allocation of Power Between the Majority and the Minority 
1.  The Difference Between NCS and CS Companies 
We have thus far assumed that empowering shareholders as a 
group to make a decision means that a majority of shareholders will 
have the effective power to make the decision.  But whether the ma-
jority of shareholders can exercise the power held by shareholders 
generally depends on the governance arrangements in place.  Cor-
porate law or the company’s governance arrangements can limit the 
majority’s ability to exercise shareholder voting power and can em-
power the minority to make certain decisions or exercise veto power 
over others.  A corporate action may require supermajority approval, 
for example, or even approval by a majority of the minority  
shareholders.  We will refer to any arrangement that prevents the 
majority from exercising the full power that shareholders acting un-
animously would wield as an arrangement that empowers minority 
shareholders. 
The impact of measures that limit the power of the majority of 
shareholders depends on the company’s ownership structure.  This 
variance is again due to the fundamental difference between CS and 
NCS companies with respect to the agency problems that confront 
outside investors.  In NCS companies, because the main agency prob-
lem is opportunism on the part of management, and because share-
holders face collective action problems, arrangements that make it 
difficult for the majority to act may undermine shareholders’ ability to 
constrain insider opportunism. 
In contrast, in CS companies, making it easier for the majority of 
shareholders to have its way cannot alleviate, and may exacerbate, the 
key concern of controller opportunism.  Indeed, one strategy for ad-
dressing this agency problem is constraining the voting power of the 
majority of shareholders or empowering minority shareholders as a 
group to influence certain decisions.  Delaware case law, for example, 
encourages controllers to subject self-dealing transactions to a majority-
of-minority vote.126  And some jurisdictions condition self-dealing trans-
actions on the approval of a majority of disinterested shareholders.127
126 Specifically, a majority-of-minority requirement shifts the burden to the minor-
ity to show that the transaction is unfair.  See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 
1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“[A]n approval of the transaction by an independent commit-
tee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of 
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2.  Treatment by Governance Standards 
The CGQ system disfavors two arrangements that require super-
majority approval for fundamental changes:  the supermajority voting 
requirement for mergers and the supermajority requirement for char-
ter amendments.128  This negative treatment of supermajority voting 
arrangements may be sensible for NCS companies, and its presence 
may reflect the NCS mindset of those designing the CGQ system.  In 
NCS companies, supermajority requirements can insulate the board 
from shareholder intervention and serve as an antitakeover device.  
Indeed, a study coauthored by one of us that focused on NCS compa-
nies in the U.S. market finds that such supermajority requirements are 
negatively correlated with firm value.129
Supermajority voting arrangements are likely to have different ef-
fects in CS companies, however.  When the company has a controlling 
shareholder, these arrangements limit the controller’s ability to pass 
proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the 
challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”). 
127 See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY HANDBOOK § 11.1.7(4) (2007), available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/handbook/LR/11/1.pdf (requiring companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange to ensure that the related party does not vote on the 
resolution and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the related party’s associates do 
not vote); Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing:  The 
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy 10-12 (European Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 88/2007, 2007) (describing how the legal systems in France, Italy, 
and Germany regulate self-dealing transactions and noting that in France self-dealing 
transactions require an ex ante approval by the board of directors and ratification at 
the annual shareholder meeting).  But see Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party 
Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 11, at 101, 122 (noting 
that the requirement for a minority vote on controller transactions has not been 
adopted by most major jurisdictions). 
128 See RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 28–29, at 
15-16 (“A simple majority vote should be required to amend the charter/bylaws and to 
approve mergers or business combinations.”).  Note that we do not consider here the 
optimal scope of minority empowerment—that is, what issues should be left for the 
minority to vote on.  Rather, we claim that empowering shareholders as a group to vote 
cannot enhance minority protection in CS companies. 
129 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 784-85 (finding a negative correlation be-
tween these arrangements and firms’ Tobin Q).  This study thus included these ar-
rangements in its entrenchment index, which subsequent researchers have used as a 
measure of corporate governance.  See, e.g., Amy Dittmar & Jan Mahrt-Smith, Corporate 
Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 599, 603 (2007) (using de-
gree of managerial entrenchment caused by takeover defenses and large-shareholder 
monitoring as measures of corporate governance). 
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resolutions, thereby empowering minority shareholders and poten-
tially limiting controller opportunism.130
The Anti-Director Rights Index does not include provisions for 
supermajority voting or similar arrangements that empower minority 
shareholders.  The Anti-Self-Dealing Index, however, does take into 
account one type of minority-empowering provision—a requirement 
that related-party transactions be approved by a majority of “disinter-
ested” shareholders.131  Such majority-of-the-minority votes, which are 
not given weight in the CGQ system, should be taken into account in 
assessing investor protection in CS companies.  Such requirements, 
however, are not practically relevant to the protection of outside in-
vestors in NCS companies. 
The arrangements that we have thus far discussed concern deci-
sions that are not “divisible”—that is, either the majority or the minor-
ity of the shareholders will have its way.  With respect to director elec-
tions, however, some arrangements provide minority shareholders 
with partial power, enabling these shareholders to influence the selec-
tion of some—but not all—directors.  Cumulative voting, for example, 
enables minority shareholders to elect some directors even against the 
controller’s wishes.132  Both the CGQ and the Anti-Director Rights In-
dex treat cumulative-voting arrangements favorably.133
130 Supermajority voting requirements will fail to protect the minority when the 
controller has enough voting power to overcome even the supermajority requirement.  
For example, a requirement for a seventy percent vote would not contain controllers 
holding eighty percent of the voting power. 
131 See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 434 tbl.1. 
132 Cf. BERNARD BLACK ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA AT THE MIL-
LENNIUM: ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: FINAL REPORT AND LEGAL 
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(2000), reprinted in 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 564-65 (2001) (recommending that Korea 
strengthen cumulative voting to protect minority shareholders); Bernard Black & Re-
inier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1947-49 
(1996) (describing the virtues of cumulative voting as including enhancing share-
holder access to company information, increasing the independence of directors from 
managers, and supporting the idea that directors have a primary duty to shareholders 
and not to officers); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors:  A New Look at 
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 127-28 (1994) (arguing that large institu-
tional shareholders should advocate cumulative-voting systems and suggesting that 
cumulative-voting systems improve corporate governance and benefit overall share-
holder welfare). 
133 See RISKMETRICS, U.S. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 42, ¶ 8, at 8 (“Shareholders 
should have the right to cumulate their votes for directors.”); supra text accompanying 
note 52. 
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Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of cumulative voting 
in CS and NCS companies is outside the scope of this Article.  For our 
purposes, what is most important is that the impact of cumulative vot-
ing on investor protection could well depend on ownership structure.  
Cumulative voting, we suggest, is more important for investor protec-
tion in CS companies than in NCS companies. 
In an NCS company, a challenger enjoying the support of a major-
ity of the outside shareholders will be able to get board seats (indeed, 
all the board seats up for election), even under the winner-takes-all 
system of elections.  Moreover, in an NCS firm, cumulative voting may 
impede a challenger’s ability to quickly replace the incumbent board 
by giving minority shareholders (who may be aligned with the incum-
bents) the ability to elect some board members.  In contrast, in a CS 
company, a challenger enjoying the support of minority shareholders 
will not be able to get any board seats without cumulative voting.  
Thus, even if one takes the view that cumulative voting is desirable in 
both CS and NCS companies, its value, and thus the weight given to its 
presence, should differ between CS and NCS companies. 
F.  Director Independence 
1.  The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies 
Legal systems around the world increasingly require boards to 
have a significant number of independent directors.134  These inde-
pendent directors are often assigned the task of deciding matters that 
raise potential conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and 
outside investors.135
Independent directors may be less willing to go along with insider 
opportunism in both CS and NCS firms.  Indeed, a growing body of 
empirical research shows that independent directors who serve on the 
134 For a comprehensive analysis of director independence in U.S. firms, see gen-
erally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005:  
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
135 On the role of independent directors in Britain and Japan, see Donald C. 
Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99-102 (2007).  
For a review of the statutory requirements for independent directors in China, see 
Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model:  Board Reforms and the Political 
Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 3-9 (2006). 
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board or on certain key committees could enhance investor protection 
even in countries where concentrated ownership is prevalent.136
But even though independent directors may improve governance 
at both NCS and CS companies, assessing director independence 
should proceed differently in these two types of companies.  The criti-
cal question is from whom should directors be independent?  In NCS 
companies, the principal concern is managerial opportunism, so it is 
important to ensure directors’ independence from the company and 
its management.  Indeed, a director affiliated with a significant out-
side blockholder may be especially likely to act independently of man-
agement, because such a director may have stronger incentives to en-
hance share value by monitoring management effectively and 
constraining insider opportunism. 
In contrast, the principal concern in CS companies is controller 
opportunism, so assessment of their governance should focus on di-
rector independence from the controller.  Ties between directors and 
the controller (or entities affiliated with it) may make the directors 
less effective in limiting controller opportunism. 
To be sure, under the assumption that the controlling share-
holder dominates the company, a director’s close ties with the com-
pany would normally imply her lack of independence from the con-
troller as well.  But the opposite does not hold:  independence from 
the company does not necessarily imply independence from the con-
troller.  Seemingly independent directors may depend, for example, 
on another business controlled by the company’s controlling share-
holder.  In sum, when one evaluates the governance of CS companies, 
significant weight should be given to director independence from (or 
dependence on) the controlling shareholder.
2.  Treatment by Governance Standards 
Both the Anti-Director Rights Index and the Anti-Self-Dealing In-
dex give no weight to director independence, thus overlooking a fac-
tor that is relevant for both CS and NCS companies.  In contrast, the 
136 See Black et al., supra note 2, at 407-10 (finding that, even in developing coun-
tries with emerging markets, there is a strong connection between board independ-
ence and market value); Jay Dahya et al., supra note 46, at 96 (conducting a study of 
firms in twenty-two countries and concluding that a dominant shareholder in a country 
that provides little legal protection for shareholders can increase the market value of a 
firm by electing independent directors). 
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CGQ rating system does attach significant weight to the presence of 
independent directors and their decision-making role. 
The CGQ system grades boards with at least a two-thirds member-
ship of independent directors and boards with nominating, compensa-
tion, and governance committees consisting solely of independent di-
rectors.137  In evaluating director independence, however, the CGQ 
rating system focuses almost exclusively on ties between directors and 
the firm on the board of which they serve.  In discussing director inde-
pendence for purposes of the CGQ rating system, RiskMetrics notes di-
rectors’ “adequate independence from management” but does not ex-
plicitly refer to director independence from controlling shareholders.138
RiskMetrics also provides various measures of independence that 
seek to cover a range of possible links between a director and the com-
pany, but it does not cover to the same extent the possible relation-
ships between a director and a controlling shareholder.139  Under 
RiskMetrics’s definition of independence, for example, a company 
employee would likely be defined as an “inside director,” but an em-
ployee of another company that the controller owns would not be so 
defined.140  Given the prevalence of business groups around the world, 
this failure to take into account directors who depend on other firms 
controlled by the company’s controlling shareholder is problematic.  
Similarly, under RiskMetrics’s definition of independence, a control-
ler sitting on the board would be defined as an inside director if she 
has more than fifty percent of voting power but not, for example, if 
she has forty-five percent of voting power.141
Several other components of the CGQ system reinforce the im-
pression that its designers were mostly concerned with director inde-
pendence from management, not controlling shareholders.  The 
CGQ system includes several provisions that address the relationship 
between the board and the CEO:  former CEOs are discouraged from 
serving on the board; the positions of CEO and board chair should be 
137 RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 1–4, at 4-6.  
Note that neither the Anti-Director Rights Index nor the Anti-Self-Dealing Index lists 
director independence as one of the criteria for evaluating investor protection.  These 
indices thus assign no weight to a factor that, albeit in different ways, could be useful 
for both CS and NCS companies. 
138 Id. ¶ 1, at 4-5. 
139 Id. (designating three categories of directors—inside, affiliated, and independ-
ent—and emphasizing the need for board independence from management). 
140 Id.
141 Id.
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separated; and directors are encouraged to meet without the CEO 
present.142  The view underlying these provisions is that the CEO is the 
key, powerful insider who needs to be monitored by directors.143  But 
the situation in CS companies run by professional managers is often 
different.144  In such companies, the key, powerful figure whose oppor-
tunism needs to be constrained may well be the controller.  Where 
this is the case, it is unlikely that having CEO-chair separation with the 
controller serving as the chair will enhance the protection of outside 
investors.
G.  Arrangement Governing Potential Value Diversion 
1.  The Difference Between CS and NCS Companies 
An important set of governance arrangements directly regulates 
actions and transactions that might divert value from outside investors 
to corporate insiders.  As we explained earlier, controlling sharehold-
ers may divert value from outside investors by using channels different 
from those through which NCS company insiders might attempt to do 
so.  Accordingly, limiting insider-value diversion effectively may re-
quire different sets of arrangements in NCS and CS companies. 
Specifically, assessing the governance of CS companies requires 
close attention to the arrangements governing freezeouts, related-
party transactions with the controller or entities affiliated with it, and 
taking corporate opportunities.145  These types of actions are relatively 
less important in NCS companies, as professional managers com-
monly have fewer opportunities to engage in related-party transac-
tions or to take corporate opportunities on a large scale.146  In con-
trast, an assessment of the governance of NCS companies should 
142 Id. ¶¶ 11–12, at 53. 
143 See Gordon, supra note 134, at 1472 (“[A]n increasingly important element of 
the independent board’s monitoring role came to be the appropriate use of market 
signals . . . in CEO termination decisions.”). 
144 A “professional CEO” connotes a CEO who is neither the controlling share-
holder nor related in any meaningful way to the controlling shareholder. 
145 Establishing a case against controlling shareholders for taking corporate op-
portunities might be a complicated task, especially when the controller is another cor-
poration that operates within the same industry.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (finding that an international oil company did not 
usurp corporate opportunities that belonged to its Venezuelan subsidiary). 
146 Management can also divert value from shareholders by buying a public com-
pany from its outside investors and taking it private in a management buyout.  See gen-
erally Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985). 
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assign an increased weight to the arrangements governing executive 
compensation.147
2.  Treatment by Governance Standards
Beginning with the modes of value diversion that are relatively 
more important for NCS companies, we should note that more than 
ten components of the CGQ system—almost one-fifth of all the com-
ponents—deal with executive compensation and stock ownership by 
directors and officers.148  Although this approach may be appropriate 
for NCS companies, where executive compensation is a central issue, 
it is inappropriate for CS companies, where concerns about value di-
version through executive compensation typically do not occupy such 
a central role.  It is especially inappropriate in CS companies with a 
professional manager who is not affiliated with the controller, where 
one can expect the controller to monitor executive pay and constrain 
excessive pay arrangements. 
Turning to CS companies, it is important to note that the CGQ 
system assigns little weight to the regulation of freezeouts and related-
party transactions involving controlling shareholders.  The non-U.S. 
system has only one provision related to this important set of insider 
actions, and it applies only to transactions involving the CEO.149  In CS 
companies, however, the related-party transactions that deserve most 
attention are those involving the controller (directly or indirectly). 
Furthermore, the CGQ system’s provisions do not focus on the 
scope of related-party transactions.  The provisions presumably reflect 
the view that the sheer existence of such transactions is a sign of gov-
ernance problems.  But in many CS companies, especially those that 
are part of a business group or a holding company structure, some re-
lated-party transactions are common, and the mere existence of such 
transactions is not an important signal of governance failures.  What is 
important for assessing the quality of governance in such companies is 
the scope of self-dealing transactions and the mechanisms for moni-
toring them.  These considerations further reinforce the conclusion 
that the CGQ system does not provide a good measure of governance 
problems in CS companies. 
147 When the controller is hired by the firm, her executive compensation could be 
classified as controller self-dealing. 
148 RISKMETRICS, NON-U.S. INDICATOR DEFINITIONS, supra note 42, ¶¶ 3, 35–44, at 
6, 19-23. 
149 Id. ¶ 17, at 11. 
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In contrast, the Anti-Director Rights Index and the Anti-Self-
Dealing Index do pay significant attention to potential value diversion 
by controllers, but they pay little attention to executive compensation.  
One of the six key components of the Anti-Director Rights Index con-
cerns oppressed-minorities mechanisms, broadly defined to include 
measures that grant minority shareholders rights either to challenge 
controller opportunism in court or to have their shares redeemed in 
the presence of such opportunism.150  The Anti-Self-Dealing Index, in 
turn, focuses exclusively and in detail on measures that regulate re-
lated-party transactions.151  Thus, these two indices, and especially the 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index, pay close attention to value-diversion chan-
nels that are important for CS companies,152 but they tend to overlook 
executive-compensation issues that are relatively important for NCS 
companies. 
This conclusion is especially strong in the case of the Anti-Self-
Dealing Index.  This index focuses on the regulation of a paradig-
matic related-party transaction between a public company and a pri-
vate company owned by the public company’s controlling sharehold-
ers.153  The constraints on such a transaction might well be vital for CS 
companies, but they are far less important for assessing governance at 
NCS companies.  Thus, although the index was intended to serve, and 
has been used, as a metric for investor protection around the world, 
its design renders it ineffective as a measure of the quality of investor 
protection in NCS companies. 
III. GOING FORWARD
As we stressed at the outset, we do not wish to undermine the im-
portant project of developing objective metrics for measuring the 
quality of corporate governance around the world; we would like to 
see the project pursued more effectively, not abandoned.  Nor do we 
wish to limit ourselves to pointing out the shortcomings in past work 
150 La Porta et al., supra note 13, at 1122 tbl.1. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
152 We should note here that, although the title of this provision refers to “minor-
ity oppression,” its definition is so broad that it could perhaps also include remedies 
that would be available for shareholders at NCS companies.  See Spamann, supra note 
14, at 9 (referring to this provision as being “extremely broad”). 
153 See Djankov et al., supra note 13, at 432-33 (setting forth an example of a styl-
ized self-dealing transaction and using the Anti-Self-Dealing Index to measure whether 
a hypothetical controlling shareholder will be able to get away with the transaction). 
2009] Global Governance Standards 1307
by academics and practitioners; rather, we seek to identify ways to im-
prove the development of governance metrics. 
In Section A, we discuss the proper approach for evaluating com-
panies’ governance arrangements.  In Section B, we consider the de-
sirable approach for assessing countries and legal systems. 
A.  Evaluating Companies 
Our thesis is that different sets of standards should be used to 
evaluate the governance of CS and NCS companies.  In this Section, 
we outline several key elements of these separate rating systems. 
We fully recognize that, as noted in the Introduction, some com-
panies belong to a gray area and cannot be easily classified as CS or 
NCS.  These are companies in which a shareholder has a block large 
enough to make control difficult to contest but not large enough to 
make control de facto uncontestable.  For these companies, it would 
be necessary to appropriately combine elements of the two rating sys-
tems that we discuss below.  We defer this additional task to another 
day and focus instead on the more fundamental task:  putting forward 
standards for assessing corporate governance at the large number of 
public companies that can easily be classified as either a CS or an NCS 
company.154
We begin by outlining the basic elements necessary for assessing 
corporate governance at NCS firms and then discuss the necessary 
elements for assessing CS firms.  We do not purport to provide a com-
plete and fully detailed account of the two evaluation systems.  Rather, 
we identify the type of governance arrangements on which each 
evaluation system should focus.
154 Another complication arises because a company may change from one type to 
another over time.  Thus, an NCS company might turn into a CS company if a majority 
of shareholders accepts a tender offer for its shares.  When a controlling shareholder 
emerges, the company’s governance and the value of minority shares will have to be 
assessed according to the CS standard.  Thus, shareholders trying to estimate the value 
of minority shares in the event of a takeover would do well to use a CS standard rather 
than the NCS standard applicable to the company pretakeover.  Governance arrange-
ments can also affect the transition from one ownership structure to another. See gen-
erally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=203110.  Finally, governance arrangements such as supermajority 
vote requirements also can affect the percentage ownership that would allow a share-
holder to become a controlling shareholder. 
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1.  NCS Companies
a. Control Contests 
As we explained earlier, an active market for corporate control 
has an important effect on management of NCS companies.  Any sys-
tem for assessing the corporate governance of NCS companies should 
thus assign substantial weight to the arrangements governing hostile 
takeovers and proxy fights, even though scholars and practitioners 
may differ in their views on which arrangements concerning such con-
trol contests are optimal. 
b. Shareholder Voting Procedures 
In NCS companies, shareholder voting power is one of the pri-
mary mechanisms for aligning the interests of directors and officers 
with those of shareholders.  The extent to which shareholders’ voting 
power is not only formal but also effective depends on the detailed set 
of procedures that governs shareholder voting.  A system for evaluat-
ing corporate governance at NCS companies should thus give signifi-
cant weight to the existence of arrangements that facilitate the ability 
of a majority of shareholders to express its will on certain key issues 
through voting.  Thus, among other things, governance evaluation at 
NCS companies should give weight to arrangements such as share-
holder ability to (1) vote by mail, proxy, or written consent, (2) vote 
without depositing shares, (3) place governance proposals and board 
nominees on the company’s ballot, and (4) be protected by confiden-
tial voting. 
c.  Allocation of Power Between the Board and Shareholders 
In addition to voting procedures, governance in NCS companies 
depends significantly on the scope of shareholders’ voting power—or 
what shareholders can vote on.  A system for evaluating corporate 
governance at these companies should therefore take into account 
such issues as shareholders’ effective power to initiate governance 
changes, as well as the existence of requirements for a shareholder 
vote on fundamental transactions, firm-governance arrangements, 
and manager-compensation packages.  Again, there may be room for 
reasonable disagreement about the most desirable allocation of power 
between shareholders and the board.  But there is a good basis for 
agreement that the nature of the arrangements governing such alloca-
tion should be given weight in assessing the governance of NCS firms. 
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d.  Executive Compensation 
Suboptimal compensation arrangements can be a main channel 
for insider opportunism at NCS companies.  Therefore, a system of 
governance assessment for these companies should consider the ex-
tent to which compensation arrangements are consistent with the goal 
of enhancing firm value.  The assessment could include not only the 
substantive aspects of compensation arrangements but also the proc-
ess for setting executive-pay schemes—for example, the composition 
of the compensation committee, the committee’s decision-making 
process, and the requirements (if any) for shareholder ratification of 
option plans or other pay package components.  And while any 
evaluation of governance in NCS companies should pay some atten-
tion to the arrangements governing self-dealing transactions with offi-
cers and directors, the weight given to self-dealing should be less than 
that accorded in a system that evaluates governance in CS companies. 
e.  Director Independence 
Director independence can enhance the protection of outside in-
vestors at both CS and NCS companies.  A company’s ownership struc-
ture, however, determines the type of relationships that should be con-
sidered when assessing director independence.  In NCS companies, 
that assessment should focus on the ties between directors and man-
agement, and (assuming management’s control over the company) the 
ties between directors and the company on whose board they serve.  In 
contrast, ties between directors and outside blockholders who are not 
themselves tied to management might be beneficial, making directors 
more attentive to, and focused on, shareholder interests.
2.  CS Companies
a. Allocation of Power Between the Majority and the Minority 
In CS companies, the distribution of power among shareholders is 
important.  Is the majority able to wield all the power reserved for 
shareholders, or does the minority have a say?  One important way to 
protect outside investors at CS companies is to empower minority 
shareholders to block certain corporate transactions and other ac-
tions.  In particular, such power might be desirable when the interests 
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of the controller and minority outside investors diverge.155  A system 
for rating corporate governance at CS firms should thus pay attention 
to arrangements that empower minority shareholders (or limit the 
power of the majority shareholders) with respect to certain deci-
sions—for example, the extent to which minority shareholders are in 
a position to block related-party transactions between the controller 
and the company.  In addition, assessments of governance in CS com-
panies should take into account the existence of arrangements, such 
as cumulative voting, that provide minority shareholders with the abil-
ity to influence board composition. 
b. Self-Dealing and Freezeouts 
In CS companies, self-dealing transactions that involve controlling 
shareholders or their affiliates provide a principal channel for divert-
ing value from the firm and its outside shareholders.  The risk of value 
diversion through self-dealing is exacerbated when dominant families 
control a relatively large number of public companies through pyra-
mids and other similar structures.  To be sure, the quality of the 
mechanisms that govern self-dealing should not serve as the exclusive 
metric for evaluating corporate governance at CS companies.156  Yet a 
system for evaluating corporate governance at such firms should as-
sign considerable weight to the mechanisms—such as disclosure, vot-
ing requirements, and fiduciary duties—that govern self-dealing 
transactions in general and “going private” freezeouts in particular.  
Moreover, the relative weight of these mechanisms when assessing the 
overall governance of CS firms should be significantly higher than 
their weight when assessing the governance of NCS firms.157
155 In NCS firms, in contrast, arrangements that require more than a standard ma-
jority vote would tend to protect managers, undermine their accountability to the ma-
jority of shareholders, and even discourage hostile takeovers.  A system for evaluating 
governance at NCS firms should thus treat negatively any supermajority voting re-
quirements. 
156 As we explained earlier, the Anti-Self-Dealing Index focuses exclusively on 
measures for regulating controlling shareholders’ self-dealing transactions.  See supra
subsection I.C.2. 
157 Other types of arrangements that should be evaluated in CS firms are those 
that prevent controllers from selling their control block when the sale would likely in-
crease the diversion of value from the firm to the new controller.  See, e.g., Einer El-
hauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1473 
(1992) (“[C]ourts have sometimes held controlling shareholders liable when a control 
transaction effectively ‘diverts’ a corporate or collective opportunity.”). 
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c.  Director Independence 
As stressed earlier, independent directors can enhance investor 
protection in both CS and NCS companies.  In CS companies, how-
ever, directors can be genuinely independent only when they have no 
ties to the controlling shareholder or its affiliates.  Thus, an assess-
ment of director independence that focuses only on ties between di-
rectors and the company on the board of which they serve may miss 
the mark.  Moreover, in evaluating director independence at CS com-
panies, one should also consider the extent to which the controller 
can influence the process of nominating and electing independent 
directors.  Relatedly, CS companies should get little credit, if any, for 
having directors meet for “executive” sessions in which management is 
not present but the controller or its representative is. 
d.  Control Contests 
Because control in CS companies is not contestable, any assess-
ment that credits CS companies for the presence of arrangements fa-
cilitating control contests would introduce substantial noise and might 
make overall governance scores less accurate and informative.  The 
absence or unavailability of a poison pill, for example, has virtually no 
impact on the likelihood of a hostile takeover in a company with a ma-
jority shareholder.  A system for rating CS companies should therefore 
not include elements based on the presence of arrangements that fa-
cilitate or impede hostile bids and proxy contests.158
e.  Shareholder Voting Procedures 
The procedures governing shareholder voting are substantially 
less important for CS than for NCS companies.  To be sure, there is 
no good reason why even CS companies should have procedures that 
impede, discourage, or distort voting by outside shareholders.  Given 
the ability of a controller to determine the outcome of votes, however, 
the absence of such procedures does not necessarily improve the pro-
tection of outside investors in CS companies.  Thus, any methodology 
for assessing governance in CS companies should generally assign lit-
tle weight (if any) to arrangements governing voting procedures, such 
as shareholder ability to vote by mail, proxy, or written consent; share-
158 The presence of such arrangements—and especially those included in the by-
laws or charter—might have some indirect impact to the extent that a CS firm might 
become an NCS firm in the future. 
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holder right to vote without depositing shares and by secret ballot; 
and shareholder ability to place proposals on the company’s proxy 
statement.
The discussion above focuses on matters subject to a majority-vote 
rule.  As we explained earlier, however, shareholder voting can play a 
valuable role in enhancing minority protection at CS companies when 
the requirement for shareholder approval is combined with measures 
to empower the minority, such as majority-of-minority voting re-
quirements.  In the case of such votes, procedures that facilitate undis-
torted voting by minority shareholders may well be consequential, and 
their presence or absence should be duly taken into account when 
evaluating governance. 
f. Allocation of Power Between Boards and Shareholders 
In CS companies, measures that expand the scope of issues on 
which shareholders can vote or strengthen the ability of the majority 
of shareholders to influence board decisions would be unlikely to en-
hance the protection of outside investors.  Indeed, as we explained 
earlier, measures that insulate directors from the controller—for ex-
ample, making it difficult to fire directors—may sometimes enhance 
the protection of minority shareholders at CS companies.  It follows 
that a system for evaluating governance in CS companies should not 
give significant positive weight to the presence of arrangements, such 
as requirements for a shareholder ratification of auditor selection or 
shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation, that expand 
the formal scope of shareholder voting power. 
g. Executive Compensation 
As explained earlier, even though excessive-compensation ar-
rangements could be an issue in CS companies, they are probably less 
important in such companies than in NCS companies.159  Accordingly, 
in evaluating corporate governance, the substantive and procedural 
limitations on executive compensation should occupy a less central 
role in CS companies than in NCS companies. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 (noting a controller’s interest in 
maximizing shareholder value). 
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h. Controlling Minority Shareholders 
Controlling shareholders may use arrangements such as pyramids, 
dual-class shares, and other mechanisms to separate cash-flow and vot-
ing rights.160  When such arrangements are in place, the controller can 
have an absolute lock on control even though it has less—and some-
times substantially less—than half of the company’s cash flows.  Other 
things being equal, the interests of the so-called controlling minority 
shareholders overlap with those of outside investors to a lesser degree 
than do the interests of a controlling majority shareholder.161  As a re-
sult, concerns about insider opportunism should increase when con-
trol is locked in the hands of controlling minority shareholders.  In-
deed, evidence indicates that firm value decreases as the difference 
between equity ownership and voting control increases.162  A system of 
governance assessment at CS companies should thus take into account 
the presence of controlling minority shareholders and the degree to 
which voting rights and cash-flow rights are separated. 
B. Evaluating Legal Systems 
Our analysis has thus far focused on the appropriate approach for 
comparing the quality of corporate governance across firms.  But an-
other important task for academics, investors, and policymakers is to 
evaluate the extent to which countries differ in terms of the level of 
protection that they provide—through their legal rules and institu-
tional arrangements—to outside investors in their public firms. 
Thus far, research conducting cross-country comparisons has gen-
erally been based on a single standard for measuring countries’ levels of 
investor protection.  To date, there have been more than one hundred 
cross-country studies based on either the Anti-Director Rights Index or 
160 For an analysis of these devices and their corporate-governance implications, 
see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 86, at 295. 
161 The term “controlling minority” was introduced by Bebchuk et al., id.  This 
study shows that agency costs can be expected to increase, and to do so at an increas-
ing rate, with declines in the fraction of cash-flow rights owned by the controlling mi-
nority shareholder. 
162 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of 
Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002); Paul Gompers et. al., Extreme Governance:  An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Companies in the United States (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 12-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=562511. 
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the Anti-Self-Dealing Index.163  As in the case of companies, however, 
our analysis suggests that the use of a single metric is inappropriate. 
Because many rules and arrangements have different effects on in-
vestor protection in CS and NCS companies, a given country may pro-
vide outside investors in CS and NCS companies with different levels of 
protection.  For example, one country may do much better than others 
in protecting outside investors in NCS companies but do a relatively 
poor job of protecting them in CS companies.  Researchers, investors, 
and policymakers, we suggest, should not assign each country a single 
score for its quality of investor protection, but rather two scores:  one 
for the quality of protection accorded to investors in NCS companies 
(the country’s NCS score) and one for the quality of protection ac-
corded to investors in CS companies (the country’s CS score). 
At first glance, it might appear that assigning two different scores 
should be only an intermediate step, followed by combining the two 
into a single score representing the country’s overall quality of inves-
tor protection.  One could, for example, simply average the country’s 
NCS and CS scores.  Such an approach, it might be argued, would 
provide a single, easy-to-use metric for cross-country comparisons 
while taking into account the relationship that we have analyzed be-
tween ownership structures and corporate governance.  For many im-
portant purposes, however, keeping two separate scores and not com-
bining them would be far more useful for researchers, investors, and 
policymakers. 
Consider first a researcher or policymaker who wants to know how 
two countries compare in their overall level of investor protection.  
The combined measure considered above could be misleading to the 
extent that controlled and widely held structures are not equally rep-
resented in each country’s public equity market.  For example, if most 
of the countries’ companies have controlling shareholders, basing the 
comparison on the countries’ CS scores would be more appropriate 
than basing it on the countries’ combined CS and NCS scores.  If NCS 
companies dominate in both countries, basing the comparison on 
NCS scores would be more appropriate.  And if NCS companies 
dominate in one country and CS companies dominate in the other, 
then the comparison may be best when based on comparing the NCS 
score of the first country with the CS score of the second. 
Next, consider a researcher or an investor who is interested in 
only a limited subset of particular companies.  In this case, it would be 
163 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
2009] Global Governance Standards 1315
best to use the country’s CS score to examine companies that have a 
controller and its NCS score to review companies that do not.  Clearly, 
even if NCS companies dominate in a country, using the country’s 
NCS score to analyze investor protection in a set of CS companies 
would be inferior to using the country’s CS score and vice versa. Ac-
cordingly, a researcher comparing firms from around the world and 
seeking to control for the level of investor protection in each firm’s 
country should use a country’s CS score as a control for a CS firm in 
this country and the country’s NCS score as a control for an NCS firm 
in this country.    
Consider now researchers or policymakers seeking to improve a 
country’s level of investor protection or to track improvements in this 
level over time.  As our discussion above indicates, looking separately 
at each of the CS and NCS scores would commonly provide a better 
picture than using a single, combined measure.  For example, an in-
crease in the country’s combined CS and NCS score would not repre-
sent a meaningful improvement to the extent that it resulted from an 
increase in the country’s NCS score when most of the country’s public 
companies have controlling shareholders. 
Similarly, those interested in the political economy of investor 
protection would do well to keep a country’s CS and NCS scores sepa-
rate.164  Consider a researcher or a policymaker who is interested in 
understanding the forces that produced a country’s current arrange-
ments and identifying possible impediments to reform.  The country’s 
existing ownership structures determine what type of insiders—
controllers of CS companies or professional managers of NCS compa-
nies—wield more power in the country’s interest-group politics.  Con-
trollers and professional managers, in turn, do not focus on the same 
corporate-governance issues. 
In a country where CS companies dominate, the corporate insid-
ers with the most political power—controlling shareholders—may well 
care more about the country’s protection of outside investors at CS 
firms than at NCS firms;165 they thus may be more open to reform that 
164 For a detailed analysis of the impact of political economy on corporate govern-
ance, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Poli-
tics, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2009). 
165 Controlling shareholders may have substantial political power when they are 
wealthy families that control a large number of public companies through pyramids.  
See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth,
43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 655, 655 (2005) (arguing that disproportionate control of 
large areas of an economy can result in “greatly amplified political influence”). 
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will increase the country’s NCS score but not its CS score.  Conversely, 
in a country where NCS companies dominate, professional managers, 
who wield significant political power, may well be more focused on 
the country’s NCS score. 
It is worth noting, however, that even though it might be easier 
politically to adopt measures to improve the NCS score of a country in 
which CS companies dominate, such a reform would be less useful for 
the country’s overall investor protection and thus for the development 
of its financial markets.  Conversely, even though it might be more po-
litically palatable to adopt reforms increasing the CS score in a coun-
try dominated by NCS companies, such reforms would have limited 
consequences for the country’s overall investor protection.  Clearly, it 
is important to keep a country’s NCS and CS scores separate in order 
to obtain a good understanding of all the forces shaping that nation’s 
investor-protection system and impeding reforms in this area. 
We conclude that researchers, shareholder advisers, and policy-
makers should not overlook the rich and useful information provided 
by keeping separate scores for a country’s level of protection for inves-
tors in CS and NCS companies.  Doing so is vital for assessing how well 
the country’s system protects investors in particular companies or in 
public companies generally, how this protection has evolved over 
time, what forces have led to prevailing arrangements, and which re-
forms would be more or less difficult to obtain. 
CONCLUSION
We have shown in this Article that any attempt to assess the gov-
ernance of public firms around the world should depend critically on 
ownership structure.  Some arrangements that benefit outside inves-
tors in companies without a controlling shareholder are either practi-
cally irrelevant or even counterproductive in the presence of a con-
trolling shareholder, and vice versa. 
Because of this fundamental difference between companies with 
and without a controlling shareholder, any governance-rating meth-
odology that applies a single metric to companies or countries world-
wide is bound to produce an inaccurate or even distorted picture.  We 
have demonstrated that this problem afflicts—and undermines the ef-
fectiveness of—the CGQ system and the Anti-Director Rights and the 
Anti-Self-Dealing indices, the most influential and widely used global 
governance metrics. 
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Going forward, the quest to design a single, global rating method-
ology should be replaced by an effort to design two separate method-
ologies for assessing the governance of companies with and without a 
controlling shareholder.  We have identified in this Article the key 
elements that should and should not be included in each of these 
methodologies. When assessing an individual company, one should 
use the rating methodology that fits the company's ownership struc-
ture.  When assessing the quality of investor protection in a given 
country, one should keep separate scores on how well the country 
protects investors in companies with and without a controlling share-
holder.  We hope that our analysis will provide researchers, policy-
makers, and investors with a useful framework for evaluating and im-
proving the governance of public companies around the world. 
